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INTRODUCTION

The separation of powers provisions of the Constitution are understood as a way of controlling the exercise of state power by fragmenting it among three different institutions and guaranteeing that
fragmentation. Conventional separation of powers analysis relies on
two mechanisms to achieve and maintain the dispersal of state power:
separating legislative, executive, and judicial power in three different
branches and preserving a balance among those branches. These
ideas are not just the stuff of high school civics class; legal doctrine
governing separation of powers questions is built around them. The
first concern about the proper allocation of functions arises in many
contexts. The Prison Litigation Reform Act was constitutional only if
Congress refrained from invading the judicial power,' and the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretations of the Clean Air Act
were legitimate only if they did not represent legislation.2 So too with
the concern about balance among the branches. Observers claim that
the line-item veto upset the balance of authority between the President and the Congress,3 the legislative veto aggrandized Congress at
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the expense of the other branches,4 and the growth of the administrative state has shifted the balance of power to the executive. There is
vigorous disagreement about the proper characterization of each of
these examples, but there is little controversy about the proper
framework within which that debate should proceed.
There should be. The embarrassing secret is that both commitments at the center of separation of powers doctrine are misconceived. The effort to identify and separate governmental powers fails
because, in the contested cases, there is no principled way to distinguish between the relevant powers. The available strategies for identifying those differences-and, given the centrality of the question,
there are surprisingly few-either rest on formalistic rules that have
no content and fail for that reason, or consist of vague normative
judgments that cannot work in concrete cases. While there are other
possible methods for answering this question that are not yet fully developed in the literature, upon examination, they are not promising.
The honest assessment is that we have no way to identify the differences between the powers in contested cases, and we are not likely to
have one soon.
The effort to maintain balance among the branches fares no better. An obvious difficulty is that the claims made in the name of interbranch balance-for instance, that a development has upset the balance of power between the branches-are made without conveying
why we should care about that balance. Such claims rest on assumed
salient differences between the branches of government; the distribution of authority among the branches matters because those institutions will not decide questions in the same way. That intuition about
inter-branch difference is taken as truth, but it is weakly supported
and open to question. Nonetheless, understanding why we should
care about this question is a step forward. It does not, however, rescue
the concept. Indeed, it is a hopeless enterprise to talk about balance
Item Vetoes and Separation of Powers, 47 DuKE L.J. 1171, 1196 (1998) (stating that the lineitem veto gives the President lawmaking power, and that "it violates the general principle of separation of powers to give such lawmaking power to the President"); Maxwell
L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 401
(1992) ("[T]he item veto would rework a fundamental shift in the balance of power,
providing the President with powerful opportunities to influence the direction and
shape of legislative priorities .... ).
4 A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88
Nw. U. L. REV.
1346, 1368 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of PresidentialLawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123,165 (1994).
r, Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1725, 1819-21
(1996).
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among the branches of government. We have not come close to articulating a vision of what an ideal balance would look like. Even if we
had tackled that normative question, we have no way to measure the
distribution of power among the branches at any point in time and no
method to predict the effect of an institutional arrangement. In
short, we do not know what balance means, how to measure it, or how
to predict when it might be jeopardized. All these deficiencies are
partly explained by the final and most fundamental difficulty with this
idea. Inquiring about inter-branch balance is incoherent because it
assumes that branches of government are unitary entities with cohesive interests, but that is not true. The institutions of the national
government are made up of individuals and sub-institutions with varying incentives that do not neatly track the institution within which
they are located.
This Article argues that the two central commitments of contemporary separation of powers law are a failure. Fine-tuning these ideas
will not redeem them. Rather, the criticisms offered here reveal that
we are thinking about questions of horizontal constitutional structure
in the wrong way. Talk of balancing three branches exercising three
powers may be comfortable, but it is also tired and, more important,
unhelpful and in some ways incoherent. Abandoning these ideas, as
we must, will make room for new ways of thinking about separation of
powers law.
Reconstructing separation of powers law will be no easy task.
While this Article cannot complete that effort, it starts it by sketching
the implications of the criticisms offered here. Taking seriously the
failings of current law offers at least two important lessons for its reconceptualization. The most significant lesson is that if one is interested in fragmenting state power and assuring that it remains fragmented, the failure of the conventional approaches is of little
moment. Those approaches seek to disperse the three powers in
three balanced branches, in part, so that no single institution controls
too much state power. This Article will argue that those efforts fail.
But in the course of noticing that there is no such thing as three essential powers exercised by three undifferentiated branches, we will
also notice that government authority is fragmented, widely so, albeit
not according to the three-powers-in-three-branches formula. Instead,
government authority is diffused among a large and diverse set of
government decisionmakers who have a hand in the exercise of state
power. The extent of that diffusion of state power is more than sufficient to put to rest any concerns about dangerous concentrations of
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government authority. And the character of that fragmentation is
such that state power is likely to remain widely dispersed. Because the
decisionmakers who share in the exercise of government authority
have varied incentives-owing to their diverse constituencies, institutional locations, and ways of doing business-there is little chance that
they would collude to concentrate government power in a few hands.
If diffusion of state authority is what we are after-and that is what
conventional approaches in part are seeking-we have it. To the extent that separation of powers doctrine is driven by worries about the
prospect of dangerous concentrations of state power in a single institution of government, those worries are misplaced.
Understanding the character of the distribution of government
authority also offers a second lesson for separation of powers law.
That law aspires to something more than general diffusion of state
power; it seeks to match the exercise of particular powers-legislative,
executive, judicial-with corresponding institutions that are best
suited to exercise those powers. The criticisms offered here suggest
that current efforts go about this ambitious undertaking in exactly the
wrong way. Conventional thinking about separation of powers operates as if it is meaningful to talk of powers and branches. There are
many flaws in that effort, but one of them is that our system does not
operate at those levels; government authority cannot be parceled
neatly into three categories, and government actors cannot be understood solely as members of a branch of government. An effort to
match particular state powers with particular government decisionmakers must start with an understanding of how those decisionmakers
might exercise that authority. That requires a fine-grained appreciation of the forces that push and pull government actors in one direction or another. A doctrine built around such understandings will offer no easy answers, but it will at least ask the right questions.
Part I of this Article presents and criticizes the two central features
of current separation of powers thinking. It argues that these ideas
fail so completely that they should be abandoned, making room for a
reconceptualization of separation of powers law that forgoes reliance
on the familiar, but unhelpful, guides of three powers and three
branches. Part II starts the reconstruction effort. The criticisms offered here diagnose particular failings of current doctrine and suggest
the more promising paths that doctrine should pursue.
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THREE SEPARATED POWERS AND THREE BALANCED BRANCHES

Those who analyze separation of powers questions are typically
thought to be deeply divided over how to resolve controversies involving the allocation of authority among the departments of the federal
government. 6 It's true, there is debate about the proper method for
deciding particular cases-a dispute that tracks the familiar choice between a rule or a standard.7 There is also disagreement about what
the principle of separation of powers substantively requires. The
deepest of these substantive differences are about the organization of
the executive branch-whether the Constitution requires that the
President control a hierarchically organized executive branch 8-and
the depth of commitment to requiring that each of the branches exercise only the power assigned to that branch, a controversy that
largely revolves around the constitutional status of administrative
agencies.9
But the depiction of disagreement is also inaccurate. The differSee Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1732-44 (describing the different approaches to analyzing the balance of powers among the branches); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136-47 (2000) (setting forth the
debate between formalist and functionalist approaches to separation of powers); Thomas W. Merrill, The ConstitutionalPrinciple of Separation of Powers, 1991 Sup. Cr. REV.
225, 226-35 (explaining the Supreme Court's two conceptions of separation of powers,
the "formal" and "functional" approaches).
7 Merrill, supra note
6, at 230.
8 The literature about the unitary executive is enormous. For a sampling
of the
literature arguing that the Constitution establishes a unitary executive, see Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J.
541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The StructuralConstitution: Unitary
Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Gary Lawson, The Rise and
Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). For a sampling of the
literature taking the opposing position, see Flaherty, supra note 5; Froomkin, supra
note 4; A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96
YALE L.J. 787 (1987). See also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that historical record does not
demonstrate that support for a unitary executive originated with the Framers themselves).
9 David P. Currie, The Distributionof Powers After Bowsher, 1986 Sup. Cr.
REV. 19,
20; Lawson, supra note 8, at 1232; see Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUp.
CT. REV. 41, 96-97 (arguing that administrative agencies are "anomalous institution [s]
created without regard to the basic principle of separation of powers upon which our
government was founded"); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 667 (1984) (arguing that
administrative agencies can be reconciled with constitutional values if they are supervised by a politically accountable chief executive and structured to encourage rivalries
among the three heads of government).
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ing approaches serve the same overarching goal: cabining the exercise of state power by fragmenting that power among three distinct
and potent branches of government. The commonalities run deeper
than adherence to this general goal. Dominant academic approaches
subscribe to specific postulates to achieve that goal and those same
postulates are central to judicial approaches to separation of powers.
The courts and most commentators are committed to distinguishing,
in at least some range of cases, among legislative, executive, and judicial powers and assuring that (barring a textual exception to that assignment) these three functions are separately exercised by the corresponding branch of government. Courts and most commentators are
also committed to assuring that no one branch of government can
dominate the others, thereby preserving some rough balance of
authority among the branches or, as the idea is sometimes articulated,
to prevent the aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another. It is predictable that these two commitments would constitute
the backbone of current approaches to separation of powers. They
are derived from the well-known provisions of the Constitution: the
vesting of three governmental functions in three distinct branches of
government, and the so-called "checks" (veto, advice and consent, and
impeachment) that represent departures from that separation.
This common ground would be a helpful starting point for further analysis if it were sensible. Unfortunately, it is not. This section
analyzes and criticizes each of the commitments.
A.

Three SeparatedPowers

The identification and separation of the three functions of government is a central tenet of most approaches to separation of powers
law.'0 Two approaches compete for primacy in the caselaw and the
commentary. One approach, often dubbed formalist, emphasizes that
the Constitution divides governmental power into three categories
and, with some explicit textual exceptions, assigns those powers to
three different branches of government. When confronting an institutional arrangement, a formalist, following a rule-like approach,
10 Approaches that urge courts to treat structural questions as nonjusticiable po-

litical questions do not depend on an ability to articulate, for purposes ofjudicial enforcement, the differences between the three functions of government. See JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCEss 260-379 (1980) (ar-

guing that judicial review is not necessary for separation of powers cases). This is a distinct minority view in the literature and, as its continued consideration of separation of
powers cases indicates, has been rejected by the Supreme Court.
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identifies the type of power exercised and asks whether it is exercised
by the appropriate department in the appropriate way." The competing approach, usually called functionalism, emphasizes that the departments of government have shared and overlapping powers, as well
as separate powers. Under this approach, the key question is whether
an institutional arrangement upsets the overall balance among those
branches by permitting one of them to compromise the "core" function of another. 2 There are, to be sure, some academic commentators who resist these schools of thought. But the Supreme Court vacillates back and forth between the two dominant approaches, relying
on something resembling the formalist approach to invalidate certain
arrangements-the line-item and legislative vetoes-and something

1 See

MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 99-134,

101 (1995) ("[T]he Court's role in separation-of-powers cases is to be limited to determining whether the challenged branch action falls within the definition of that
branch's constitutionally derived powers ....); Lawson, supra note 8, at 1237-41 ("The
institutions of the national government are creatures of the Constitution and must find
constitutional authorization for any action.").
12 See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 489 (1987) ("[A] functional
approach... stresses core function and relationship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not threatened."); Strauss, supra note 9. at 579 ("[Maintaining] the intended balance and interaction among the three named actors... with
each continuing to have effective responsibility for its unique core function, depends
on the existence of relationships between each of these actors ....[W]e should stop
pretending that all our government ...can be allocated into three neat parts."); see
also Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialPower and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451,
453 (1979) (discussing the application of separation of powers review to presidential
involvement in rulemaking and suggesting that "the Court should take a more flexible
approach" and consider "whether the other branches can effectively exercise their
checks").
13 Some of these approaches are discussed in Magill, supra note 6, at 1146-47. See,
e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513,
1515-16 (1991) (arguing that "[t]he protection of individual rights.., should be an
explicit factor in the analysis of structural issues and should provide an animating
principle for the jurisprudence of separated powers"); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced
Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 683 (1997) (offering a separation of
powers approach that focuses on the political constituencies of each branch of government and the sequence of decision making set forth in the Constitution); HaroldJ.
Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253,
1322-23 (1988) (offering an approach built around limits the Constitution prescribes
for each branch); Merrill, supra note 6, at 228 (offering a 'minimal' approach that requires every federal office to be located in one of the three branches and thus subject
to whatever limitations that apply to that branch); Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 757-60 (1999) (offering an approach that considers the
constituency relationships of the officials who will exercise power); Paul R. Verkuil,
Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
301, 303-22 (1989) (offering an approach focused on preventing conflicts of interest).
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similar to functionalism to validate other arrangements-the independent counsel statute, the exercise of adjudicatory authority by ad4
ministrative agencies.1
The focus on the differences between these schools of thought
obscures their similarities. Both are committed to dispersal of the
three governmental functions among the corresponding three governmental institutions.'r For the formalist, this commitment is obvious. It is crucial, on that understanding, that the executive department exercise executive power and no other, Congress exercise
legislative power and no other, and the courts exercise judicial power
and no other."' Professor Redish, for example, explains that under his
approach,
the Court's role in separation-of-powers cases is to be limited to determining whether the challenged branch action falls within the definition
of that branch's constitutionally derived powers-executive, legislative or
judicial. If the answer is yes, the branch's action is constitutional; if the
answer is no, the action is unconstitutional. No other questions are to be
7
asked; no other countervailing factors are to be taken into account.1

Although this premise of their approach is usually ignored, functionalists are likewise committed to a division of governmental authorMagill, supra note 6, at 1138 & n.37; Merrill, supra note 6, at 226.
Merrill, sulra note 6, at 231; see Nourse, supra note 13, at
754 n.24 (observing
that the commitment to the identification and separation of government functions can
be found even among commentators who present alternative approaches to separation
of powers).
WREDISH, sura note 11, at 99-134; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note
8, at 559-60;
4
5

Currie, supra note 9, at 19; Lawson, supra note 8, at 1237-38; see Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Vhy the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
313, 315 (1989) (writing that the Supreme Court was wrong in upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute because the Constitution "grants the
President the entire executive power of the United States, and grants it to him alone").
17 REDISH, supra note 11, at 101;
see also id. at 100 ("[The

formalist] approach ...

[is] grounded on the deceptively simple principle that no branch may be permitted to
exercise any authority definitionally found to fall outside its constitutionally delimited
powers."). Much the same can be said about other formalist commentators. Consider
Professor Calabresi's explanation of his understanding of the Constitution's requirements:
[Alny governmental power exercised in our system must be either legislative
or executive or judicial: the premises of the system do not allow for the conclusion that a power could be something other than one of these three (or
that it could be two of them at the same time).
Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1377, 1390
(1994). The rules Professor Gary Lawson extracts from the Constitution are similar:
"The Constitution thus divides the powers of the national government into three categories-legislative, executive, and judicial-and vests such powers in three separate
institutions." Lawson, supra note 8, at 1237.
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ity among the branches. While a functionalist would be flexible-in
particular, tolerating the exercise of 'judicial" or "legislative" power by
an administrative agency-as long as a "core" function of the department in question was notjeopardized,A they agree with formalists that
the Constitution allocates three different powers to three different institutions. The leading exponent of this approach would follow a
rigid requirement of functional separation with respect to the three
actors named in the Constitution; as among them, "only Congress may
legislate, only the Supreme [Court] may adjudicate, and only the
'
President may see to the faithful execution of the laws." ' And, the
flexibility of functionalism evaporates if the arrangement threatens
"core" functions. But to preserve core functions, one has to have an
idea of just what they are. In short, as Professor Thomas Merrill has
correctly observed, both schools of thought "generally agree with the
traditional understanding that governmental activities can be classified under three functional headings-legislative, executive, or judicial-with each function associated with one of the three branches of
government.""°
Strauss, supra note 12, at 489; see Strauss, supra note 9, at 579 ("[The] goal is intended balance and interaction among the three named [constitutional] actors at the
top of government, with each continuing to have effective responsibility for its unique
core function ....); see also Bruff, supra note 12, at 486-88 ("[T]he flexible approach
[applied to the President's role in agency rulemaking] must be characterized by estimations of the balance in given circumstances between the President's concerns and
the countervailing interests of the other branches and of the people."). The analysis
contained in certain Supreme Court decisions conforms to what commentators describe as functionalist analysis. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-96 (1988)
("[T]he real question is whether the removal restrictions [applicable to independent
counsel] are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his
constitutional duty ....); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982) ("[A] court,
before exercising jurisdiction [over the President], must balance the constitutional
weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority
and functions of the Executive Branch."); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,
44146 (1977) ("[lmn determining whether the [Presidential Recordings and Material
Preservation] Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the
proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 706-07 (1974) ("Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial
process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing
interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch.").
19 Strauss, supra note 9, at
596.
20 Merrill, supra note 6, at 231; see also id. at 235 (referring to "the shared preoccupation [of formalists and functionalists] with the functional classification of government activities"). Victoria Nourse has made the same observation:
It is a widely held view, common to a variety of theoretical positions, that the
three departments serve different functions and that these functional distinctions are essential to preserve the separation of powers. Assumed, here, is the
18
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To assure the institutionally separate exercise of governmental
functions, as courts and many commentators seek to do, one must be
able to identify the differences among those functions. To state the
obvious, the Constitutional terms are far from self-defining. Moreover, there is no well-accepted doctrine or theory that offers a way to
identify the differences among the governmental functions in contested cases. Indeed, given that the doctrine and many theoretical
approaches profess commitment to the separation of the three functions, the remarkable fact about the doctrine and literature is that very
little of it is devoted to identifying their contours. The sporadic judicial efforts to identify the differences among the governmental powers
are nearly universally thought to be unhelpful."
The Supreme
Court's attempt, for instance, to define legislative power in order to
assess the constitutionality of the legislative veto was widely viewed as
unsuccessful." In INS v. Chadha, the Court held that the House's veto

idea that "[t] he executive Power," the "legislative Powers," and "[t] he judicial
Power" represent different kinds of power readily distinguishable in theory, if
not in practice ....
[T]his idea of "functional" separation is implicit in positions ranging from the left to the right, from originalists to realists, and from
formalists to critical pragmatists.
Victoria Nourse, Toward a "DueFoundation"forthe Separation of Powers: The Federalist
Papers as PoliticalNarrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 493 (1996) (first and second alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
21 SeeFlaherty, supra note 5, at 1735-36 (noting the Supreme
Court's difficulty with
specifying the nature of a given power); Nourse, supra note 13, at 754, 757 & n.21
("The Supreme Court openly quarrels about how to characterize.., a single activity as
executive, judicial, and legislative."). In several cases, the Supreme Court has attempted to define the functions of government. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 121 S.
Ct. 903, 911-14 (2001) (rejecting the claim that the Clean Air Act unconstitutionally
delegated legislative power without defining legislative power); id. at 920-21 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (disagreeing with the Court's characterization and arguing that the
agency exercised legislative power); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 219-40
(1995) (defining judicial power as the power to make dispositive judgments); Metro.
Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S.
252, 276-77 (1991) (refusing to characterize the type of power exercised; power is either executive or legislative and, either way, its exercise is unconstitutional); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952, 960, 1001-02 (1983) (characterizing the legislative veto as
an exercise of legislative power though the concurrence described it as akin to adjudicative action, and the dissent described it as congressional action to limit the exercise
of legislative power by the agency); see also infra note 28 (citing cases discussing the Supreme Court's difficulty identifying the differences between the three branches of government).
22 See E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative
Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 125, 134-35 ("The Court's presumption
that the legislative veto is an exercise of Article I legislative power should only frame,
rather than decide, the issue."); Merrill, supra note 6, at 233 (observing that commentators had a field day lampooning the Court's reasoning that the House's veto was a

2001]

BEYOND POWERS AND BRANCHES

altered Mr. Chadha's legal rights and therefore constituted the exercise of legislative power that had to be approved by both houses of
23
It reached that concluCongress and presented to the President.
Mr. Chadha's legal rights
sion, however, only by contestably defining
24
veto.
legislative
the
of
prior to the exercise
Nor have commentators developed ways of distinguishing among
the three powers of government. In fact, the dominant responses to
the need to distinguish among the three powers are to ignore the
question or confess inadequacy to the task. Functionalist commentators, for their part, leave the three categories of governmental power
undefined, including the identification of the "core" functions of each
of the departments. And many formalist commentators confess inadequacy to the task: "A meaningful discussion of the definition of
the elusive term 'executive power' is beyond the scope of this Article."25
This lack of attention does not reflect some nascent consensus
about the meaning of these terms. All, in fact, acknowledge that the
lines among the three powers are, to understate the point, elusive.

legislative act).
23 Chadha,462 U.S. at 952.
24 Donald Elliott explains this point:
The legislative veto "alters legal rights," however, only because the Court
chooses to characterize its effect that way. The Court's manipulation of legal
categories could just as easily be turned to support the opposite conclusion
If Chadha's only right
that the legislative veto does not alter legal rights ....
country unless one
the
in
remain
to
right
him-the
gave
was what the statute
house exercised its legislative veto-then the House's action did not alter
Chadha's rights: the possibility of a legislative veto was built into them in the
first place.
Elliott, supra note 22, at 134-35.
25 Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 8, at 1165 n.52; see also Calabresi, supra note 17,
at 1390 n.47 ("I do not think I can attempt to address here the very difficult question
of whether to seek the original meaning of [the terms executive, legislative, or judicial], their present day meaning, or their original meaning as 'translated' into the present day world."); Lawson, supra note 8, at 1239, 1242 (suggesting that it is often difficult to distinguish between the executive and legislative powers).
26 We can dispense with some suggestions for the differences among
the powers
without much effort. Although it is often said, it cannot be that the legislative power is
concerned with resolving important policy questions, while the executive power is
merely ministerial and technical. Consider the following example: Congress criminalizes the sending of deceptive materials through the mail. The U.S. Justice Department
decides not to prosecute those who send solicitations for time shares through the mail,
even though there is a colorable argument that the information contained in the mailings is deceptive. Certainly, most would say that that decision is execution of the law,
but it is a policy choice that is hardly unimportant or technical. See REDISH, supra note
11, at 117-18 (emphasizing that the executive branch should not be confined to minis-
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Madison famously admonished: "Experience has instructed us that no
skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate
and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive and judiciary .... , Nor are our contemporaries
any more confident of their ability to define the differences among
the three governmental powers. s Professor Gary Lawson, among others, admits that "[t]he problem of distinguishing the three functions
of government has long been, and continues to be, one of the most
intractable puzzles in constitutional law."2'9
To be fair, there may be a nascent consensus that some exercises
of government authority can be pegged as executive, legislative, orju• , 30
dicial. It is easy enough to define the essence of the three government functions in abstract terms. The legislative power is the specification of the basic norms that govern behavior; the executive power
includes the implementation of those laws; and the judicial power is
the adjudication of disputes that arise under the laws. And some specific exercises of government authority seem to fall easily in one box
or another. When the executive issues a check to pay for a federal
road authorized by a statute, that, most would agree, is the exercise of
executive authority. When Congress approves the underlying statute
terial functions without any room for creativity, judgment, or discretion).
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
28 See Clinton v. New York,
524 U.S. 417, 480-81 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)
(stating that the Supreme Court cannot define the difference between the legislative
and executive powers with perfect precision). In Bowsher v. Synar, Justice Stevens explained how difficult it is to label powers:
One reason that the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot be categorically distributed among three mutually exclusive branches of
Government is that governmental power cannot always be readily characterized with only one of those three labels. On the contrary, as our cases demonstrate, a particular function, like a chameleon, will often take on the aspect of
the office to which it is assigned.
478 U.S. 714, 749 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also William B.
Gwyn, The American ConstitutionalTradition of Shared and Separated Powers: The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers,30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 263, 26768 (1989) (stating that judges should have little confidence in their ability to identify
the differences between the governmental powers).
29 See Lawson, supra note 8,
at 1238 n.45; see also Calabresi, supra note 17, at 1390
n.47 (1994) ("1 do not disagree that the task is difficult or that the terms 'executive,'
'legislative,' and 'judicial' power lack a completely coherent independent meaning as a
matter of either political science or history."). The leading functionalist commentator
also admits to the "imprecision inherent in the definition and separation of the three
governmental powers." Strauss, supra note 9, at 603.
See Gary Lawson, Delegation and the Constitution, 22 REGULATION, Nov. 2, 1999, at
23, 25 (stating that even though there is no precise definition of executive power, this
does mean that there are no boundaries between the three governmental functions).
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authorizing that road expenditure, most would agree that that is the
exercise of legislative authority. Even assuming the existence of some
core of each of the government functions, however, its existence is of
little help in contested cases. A change in the previous example asks
the nondelegation question: Could Congress, instead of deciding by
statute where roads should be built, authorize the executive to design
an efficient and useful national transportation infrastructure-federal
roads, railroad tracks, and airline routes? Or consider other examples: Is the legislative veto the exercise of legislative power? Do administrative agencies improperly exercise judicial power when they adjudicate controversies? Would a statute that constrains prosecutorial
discretion invade the executive power? None of these situations involves the uncontested core of the government functions. Yet, if one
is committed to functional separation, these cases must be properly
sorted into one category of power or another.
Perhaps there is a good explanation for this near silence on so basic a question. One might argue that there is no need for a fully developed theory about the differences among the three government
functions in order to know whether certain contested arrangements
are constitutional. Consider the example of Bowsher v. Synar, a case
involving the constitutionality of the comptroller general's role in the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction schemer' Under the Act,
the comptroller general was to prepare a report containing estimates
of the projected revenues and expenditures for the fiscal year. If the
comptroller projected a deficit, the report was to specify the spending
cuts that would be necessary to reduce the deficit to a pre-established
target. That report would be sent to the President, who would, under
the Act, be obligated to carry out the spending reductions outlined in
the report. 2 One could argue that, regardless of the type of power
the comptroller general exercised when he reported his budgetary
conclusions to the President, the way in which it was exercised did not
satisfy any of the relevant constraints. If the actions of the comptroller
general constituted the exercise of legislative power, it had not been
bicamerally approved, and if it was the exercise of executive power, it
was not being exercised by an individual appointed pursuant to the
In such a case, there is no need to identify
Appointments Clause.

31 478

U.S. at 740.
Id. at 718, 732-33.
33 See Krent, supra note 13, at 1280-81 (analyzing the implications of
characterizing
the powers exercised by the comptroller general as legislative/executive). Compare
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723-36 (majority opinion) (holding that the comptroller general's
32
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the type of power exercised by the comptroller general because, no
matter how characterized, the arrangement is unconstitutional.
The tactic may be neat but it is not satisfying. Eluding the characterization question may be a way to defend an outcome on a particular
set of facts, but it does little else. At a conceptual level, the strategy is
an odd one for those who are committed to the separation of government functions. They argue that it is important for the three functions of government to be separated institutionally from one another.
If one fails, however, to identify the type of government function at
issue in cases, the content of those three categories will remain underdeveloped. If we avoid such questions, how could we be sure that
we are institutionally separating functions? Such a failure might be
acceptable if one is skeptical of, or agnostic about, the importance of
the institutional separation of functions. But adherents of the dominant approaches are not.
More practically, the avoidance strategy fails to provide guidance
in a range of controversial and consequential cases. Consider the
boundary between executive and legislative power. There are cases
where the executive acts in ways that affect the rights and duties of
those outside the executive branch-as for example, in the promulgation of so-called legislative rules under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 34 or in the adoption of certain executive orders.
A formalist

exercise of executive power violates the presidential removal power), with Bowsher, 478
U.S. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the comptroller general's exercise of legislative power violates constitutional requirements of bicameralism
and presentment). The Supreme Court relied on this strategy in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252
(1991). There, the lower court had characterized the entity at issue in the case as exercising quintessentially executive power. The Court, however, observed that resolving
the characterization issue was not necessary because, no matter how characterized, the
entity was unconstitutional: "If the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, §
7." Id. at 276.
34 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1994).
35 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246,
3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) (President Johnson's
order requiring affirmative action contract provisions for all government contractors);
Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963) (President Kennedy's order requiring nondiscrimination in housing owned, operated, or financed by the federal government); Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-1953) (President Truman's order requiring nondiscrimination clauses in government contracts). More recent
executive orders also affect the rights of private parties. See, e.g., Exec. Order No.
12,954, 3 C.F.R. 329 (1996) (President Clinton's order allowing debarment of contractors that permanently replace striking employees); Exec. Order No. 12,933, 3 C.F.R.
927 (1995) (President Clinton's order requiring successor federal contractors to offer
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court confronting such cases would be forced to determine whether
the executive is "executing" or "legislating." The inquiry would be
slightly different for a functionalist, but the characterization question
would remain; a functionalist court would have to determine whether
the action by the executive compromised the "core" functions of Congress or the judiciary. A similar problem occurs from the other angle:
legislative action that arguably intruded on an executive power by directing the way in which that power would be exercised.3 6 The War
Powers Resolution is a prominent example of this problem, 37 and
other actions fit the pattern as well.3 ' Consider a statute controlling
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is thought by some to be at the core of executive power: A
formalist would have to decide whether a zone of prosecutorial discretion was part of the executive power and whether, through the statute,
Congress had impermissibly infringed on that power. Likewise, a
functionalist would have to ask whether a zone of prosecutorial discretion was part of a "core" executive function and, if so, whether the
statute impermissibly infringed on the exercise of that core function.

right of first refusal to employees under predecessor contractor), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,204, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,228 (Feb. 22, 2001).
36

This same problem arises in the context of the boundary between legislative and

judicial power.

See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344-350 (2000) (holding that

through the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Congress did not encroach upon the
powers of the judiciary); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding
section 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 unconstitutional because it requires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment, thus destroying separation of powers); see alsoJohn Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules
of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 539-43 (2000) (analyzing whether a statute governing
rules of precedent in federal courts would constitute an unconstitutional intrusion on
judicial power).
37See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 60-63 (1993) (defending the constitutionality of most
provisions of the War Powers Resolution against the common charge that the Resolution unconstitutionally interferes with the exercise of executive power).
38 John Harrison identifies an excellent example of this problem. See
Harrison,
supra note 36, at 541 n.1 11 (citing "a provision in the Army appropriation act for 1868
providing that all orders from the president or secretary of war to the armed forces
were to be given through the General of the Army, then U.S. Grant").
39 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-06 (1988) (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("Governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function."). But see Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV.
L. REv. 105, 126 (1988) (noting historical examples contradicting the claims that
prosecution is a core executive function); Krent, supra note 13, at 1319 ("Historically,
Congress has fragmented control over criminal law enforcement within the executive
branch ... and vested some investigative and prosecutoial authority in state officials
and private individuals outside the control of the executive.").
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If this strategy of avoiding the definitional question is not satisfactory, one must be prepared to identify the differences among the
functions of government. But there are no promising proposals for
addressing this question in either the current caselaw or commentary.4 It is worth starting with the most simple definitions of the three
powers,4' if only to see that they are not particularly helpful. Under
these definitions, legislative power is the making of general rules that
govern the rights and obligations of parties outside the legislature; the
general executive power-as opposed to the specifically enumerated
executive powers-includes the power to implement the rules enacted
by the legislature; and the judicial power is the application of those
rules in individual cases. 41
43
Focus on the distinction between legislative and executive power.
Both creating and implementing the law can govern individuals'
rights and obligations and thus that feature does not usefully distinguish legislative from executive power. For example, consider the
granting of licenses. Congress authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to grant licenses when they are "in the public interest" and sets forth a list of factors that indicate when the li-

40

This section of the Article does not focus heavily on the ways that courts have

offered to distinguish among the powers because the point made in the text about the
caselaw is well accepted. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1735-36 (stating that current
caselaw makes it difficult for both functionalists and formalists to categorize the
branches of government); Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 196, 202 ("The [Supreme Court's] model implicitly draws on
a theory of core functions; to date, however, the Supreme Court has failed to shed
much light on what that theory might be."); Nourse, supra note 13, at 754-57 (arguing
that the Supreme Court is unable to identify clear lines among the three government
functions).
41 I focus here on what one might call the general powers allocated
by the Vesting
and Take Care Clauses in the Constitution. Thus, with respect to the executive power,
for instance, I do not mean to focus on the power of the commander in chief, but
rather on the general executive power and the power to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.
42 See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS 103 (1965) (describing Montesquieu's formulation, as "[l]egislative power is concerned with making
general rules of conduct; executive power carries out the laws;.., judicial power determines how the laws affect particular persons in particular circumstances").
43 The boundaries between executive and judicial powers,
or legislative and judicial powers, are no less difficult. The Court is also occasionally asked to police those
boundaries. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341-50 (2000) (legislative/judicial
boundary); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 219-25 (1995) (same); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857-59 (1986) (txecutive/judicial
boundary). For a powerful analysis of the appropriate boundary between legislative
and judicial power in the context of congressional authority over the rules of precedent, see Harrison, supra note 36.
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cense would be in the public interest. 44 In determining which of the
various applicants should obtain a license, the FERC would be implementing that law. And, just as clearly, by granting or denying a license, the FERC would govern the rights and obligations of a third
party.
Nor is it the "general" part of governing rights and obligations
that makes legislative power different from executive power. One
might argue that only Congress can generally govern the rights and obligations of private individuals by creating a norm for a class of actors-all those seeking hydropower licenses, for instance. Executive
action, on this theory, is limited to the application of legislatively created norms in individual cases-whether a specific applicant qualifies
for a license, for instance. This definition, however, depends on an
arbitrary distinction between individual and general rules. Consider a
rule developed by the FERC pursuant to statute that requires all hydropower license applicants to include in their applications information about the effect of their dams on fisheries. That rule governs the
rights and obligations of the whole class of license applicants. While
one could take the view that executive action cannot so govern the
rights and obligations of a class,45 it is arbitrary to draw the line demarcating legislative from executive action at that point. If execution
of the law may permissibly govern the rights and obligations of individuals-classically, the grant or denial of a license-then there does
not appear to be a reason to conclude that general rules of the same
character are outside of the executive power. It seemsjust as plausible
that an executive action could include the development of general
rules that further fill out the details-and, in that way, implement-a
legislative enactment.
44 The statute directs the FERC to consider the following: 1) the purposes
of en-

ergy conservation; 2) the protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of
fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat); 3) the protection
of recreational opportunities; and 4) the preservation of other aspects of environmental quality in addition to the power and development purposes for which licenses
are issued. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1994).
45 Similar reasoning lies behind an oft-made, but differently phrased,
argument.
It is sometimes said that actions taken by administrative agencies-such as the promulgation of rules under the Administrative Procedure Act-is legislative in the sense that
the legislature itself could have enacted the rule as a statute. See Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 n.96 (1998) ("In my
view, delegated discretion is delegated legislative power, because in most instances,
Congress could have withdrawn (at least in part) that discretion.") But this characterization is dependent on the assumption-not independently defended-that any general rule governing the rights and obligations of third parties is, ipso facto, an exercise
of the legislative power.
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More elaborate efforts to identify the differences between legislation and execution are no more promising. Commentators offer two
types of arguments that track the typical choice between rules and
standards. These arguments suffer from obvious failings: the rule-like
approach is too superficial to do work in hard cases and the standardlike approach is too general to be of use.
Consider first the proceduralist approach that some courts and
commentators offer. To determine whether the exercise of a government power is legislative, executive, or judicial, a number of observers attach significance to the process by which that power is exercised. 46 As Professor Calabresi explains:
[T]here is actually a way by which we can tell what exercises of governmental power are "legislative" or 'Judicial." Governmental actions of
these types can only be performed if certain procedural prerequisites are
met: bicameralism and presentment (in the case of legislation), litiga47
tion of a case or controversy (in the case of adjudication).

This position is critically incomplete. Take the example of legislative power. Bicameralism and presentment may be necessary to the
enactment of laws. But bicameralism and presentment are obviously
not sufficient for the exercise of legislative power. If they were, then
Congress could decide an individual case so long as it did so bicamerally and presented it to the President. While Calabresi seems to recognize this problem, 4s he does little to address it.
This approach fails because it tries to follow form and ignore con-

46

Calabresi, supra note 17, at 1391. Others, such as Professor Redish, make simi-

lar arguments.
[T]he difference is the structural "baggage" that the exercise of the judicial
and executive powers are required to carry-baggage which does not affix itself to the exercise of the legislative power ....
Indeed, that it is, at least to a
large extent, the procedural and structural context in which a policy choice is
made-rather than the substance of that choice-that distinguishes the legislative and judicial functions is demonstrated by the fact that, on nonconstitutional issues, Congress may overrule judicially created substantive rules that
have been fashioned in the context of case adjudication.
REDISH, supra note 11, at 117; see also Liberman, supra note 16, at 323 ("The legislative
and executive branches make all three kinds of decisions[: policy determinations,
pure interpretation, and carrying into effect of some existing rule] .... [T]he type of
power being exercised depends on whether the decision is made in the course of writing
a law, executing a law, or deciding a case." (footnotes omitted)).
47 Calabresi, supra note 17, at 1391
(footnotes omitted).
48 As Calabresi makes clear while discussing
the full contours of executive power,
the approach he describes does not mean that "the President can take any governmental action he wants, so long as he does not follow the procedural hoops of Article I,
Section 7 or of Article Ill, Section 2." Id. (emphasis omitted).
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tent. But such content is a necessary component of the line between
legislation and execution. Commentators offer some guidance here,
but it falls far short of filling the gap. Consider, for example, Professor Calabresi's attempt to define the line between execution and legislation for purposes of the nondelegation question: "there are things
that affect private rights to such a degree, and that so traditionally
have been done by the legislature, and that so thoroughly partake of
general rulemaking that they simply must be done by Congress or not
at all. ' 40 Calabresi specifies some examples that fall in the category of
legislation: seizing steel mills, promulgation of codes of fair competition, and setting the budget of the United States.50 It is not clear
whether these examples satisfy some or all of the criteria. Nor is it
clear what we are to do if the criteria suggest different outcomes. Examining the factors more closely also raises questions about each.
Consider the "traditionalness" of an action. There are familiar normative and descriptive difficulties with this criterion. Why should the
fact that Congress has traditionally done something mean that it must
continue to do so? Could a change in circumstances ever warrant a
change in practice, and, if so, when would we know that such a change
has occurred? Descriptively, at what level of generality should that
tradition be discerned?
The two other parts of the test are no more satisfactory. If promulgating codes of unfair competition must be done by Congress, then
the Sherman Act would seem to be unconstitutional. It amounts to a
statutory delegation to noncongressional actors (courts) to develop
antitrust policy. The problem is that the criteria do not begin to address the questions of degree that make the nondelegation question
so difficult. Focusing just on the executive, there are legions of actions taken pursuant to statutes that affect private rights and that
might be called general rulemaking. How are we to determine
whether an individual example significantly affects private rights or
thoroughly partakes of general rulemaking? Is the open-ended statutory instruction to the Federal Communications Commission to grant
49 Id.; see also REDISH, supra note 11, at 101 ("In fashioning its definitions of branch
power, the Court should look to a combination of policy, tradition, precedent, and
linguistic analysis. Presumably, within certain linguistic boundaries, the definitions
may evolve over time, much as the definitions of other constitutional terms have."
(footnote omitted)).
Calabresi, supra note 17, at 1391-92.
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal.").
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broadcast licenses if "public convenience, interest, or necessity will be
served thereby 5 2 constitutional? Do the Environmental Protection
Agency's flexible interpretations of the Clean Air Act significantly af3
fect private rights, or thoroughly partake of general rulemaking?
Calabresi presents the most well developed of the tests 'offered by
commentators working in separation of powers scholarship. 4 There
is, of course, a substantial literature on the nondelegation doctrine,
and I do not mean to repeat here the arguments contained in that literature.55 But the fuzziness of the line between the legislative power
and the other powers is the reason why some judges and many commentators accept the difficulty, if not impossibility, of court enforcement of a nondelegation rule.5 " Analysis of Calabresi's test just serves
as a reminder-rather than evidence to the contrary-that the line
between legislation and execution is elusive.
Nor do commentators offer promising proposals to analyze the
legislative boundary from the other angle. How are we to determine

52
53

47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1994).
See Jon Cannon, Bargaining, Politics and Law in
Environmental Regulation, in

ENVIRONMENTAL

CONTRAcTS:

COMPARATIVE

APPROACHES

TO

REGULATORY

INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Kurt Deketelaere & Eric W. Orts
eds., 2001) (commenting that the EPA has "considerable latitude to create and dispense flexibility").
54 For Professor Redish, there must be "some
meaningful level of normative political commitment by the enacting legislators, thus enabling the electorate to judge its
representatives." REDISH, supra note I1, at 136. But, he observes, "[s]tatutes that...
amount[] to nothing more than a mandate to an executive agency to create policy"
constitute unconstitutional delegations of legislative power. Id. at 137. For his part,
Professor Lawson presents, in an admittedly preliminary analysis, an entirely circular
definition: "Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important
to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them." Lawson, supra note
8, at 1239. Finally, Professor Currie observes that "Congress may not leave the fundamental policy decisions to others. This does not preclude Congress from leaving details to another agency, for filling gaps in applying inevitably imprecise legislation is
inseparable from the executive function." Currie, supra note 9, at 28 (footnotes omitted).
55 For
a recent sampling, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993),
and Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation Doctrinefrom Constitutional
and Policy Perspectives,20 CARDozo L. REV. 731 (1999).
56 As Abner Greene has commented:
The Court tried only twice to halt such ... broad delegations before realizing
that it was too difficult to draw a line between delegations that are unconstitutionally broad, because they give the executive something that looks like lawmaking power, and those that are sufficiently narrow, because they grant
something that looks like enforcement discretion.
Greene, supra note 4, at 155.
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whether legislative action improperly micromanages executive action?
Most commentators do not even address the problem. Professor Redish, to his credit, does, and he suggests that Congress goes too far
when it "interfere [s] with the proper operation of another branch." 7
That, however, is only the beginning of the inquiry, for one then
needs to identify what it is to interfere with the proper operation of
another branch.

One might argue that the problem here is lack of effort. Perhaps
we do not have a satisfactory way to tell the difference between government functions in close cases because insufficient attention has
been devoted to the question. While there are a variety of additional
ways one might try to define legislative, executive, and judicial power,
we should not redirect our energies to these strategies because each is
likely to fail.
One method that some in the current literature implicitly suggest
as promising is the location of an authoritative baseline to guide definitional determinations. Under this method, a court would characterize a governmental activity by relying on some touchstone that would
help detennine whether a particular activity is legislative, executive, or
judicial .5 The typical options for the baseline are history, tradition, or
current practices. Consider the case of Bowsher v. Synar, where the activities of the comptroller general under the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act were at issue. ') The baseline approach would ask the following question: does what we know about the history (or tradition,
or practice) of the three governmental powers suggest that the comptroller general's activities are executive, legislative, orjudicial?
The baseline approach, however, is unlikely to escape the flaws
with present approaches identified here. Investigation of the baseline
may not yield clear enough answers to resolve specific cases. History,
for instance, may show that the legislative power includes the power of

57
58

REDISH, supra note 11, at 120.

Calabresi and Prakash have described one such touchstone.

"[T]he executive Power," for example, is probably not so much a type of
power as it is a grab bag of many specifically enumerated powers, all of which
we think of as belonging to the Executive, either because they always did so
belong in English and American history, or because the Constitution specifically assigns them to the President.
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 8, at 561 n.69.
59 478 U.S. 714,
717 (1986).
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the purse, but it may tell us little about the more difficult questions
such as what degree of spending discretion can be left to the executive? 60 If one relies on the history and tradition baselines, the outcome of the analysis is heavily dependent on the choice of the time
frame. To ask only the most pointed question: Shall we determine
the meaning of executive power before or after the New Deal? As for
the current practices baseline, which attempts to take account of the
government as it has evolved, it is vulnerable to the criticism that it
mistakes what "is" for what "ought" to be. On the other hand, the history and tradition baselines are vulnerable to the opposite and familiar criticism: one might challenge the advisability of courts' use of
original understanding, or tradition, to trump the consensus of the
current, electorally accountable departments of government.
Aside from the location of an authoritative baseline, one might
undertake a more explicitly instrumental or normative effort to define
the boundaries among the powers. One version would be to study
and evaluate the institutional structure of each of the departments of
government. This, admittedly, would be a monumental task, but the
objective would be to match the competencies of the institutions with
61
the types of powers they exercise.
Another approach, in the same
vein, would be to focus on the normative purposes served by the particular power allocations."' For example, the legislative power is vested
in Congress because of the particular nature-a bicameral body with
differing election cycles-of its electoral responsiveness, or the judi-

6 See Calabresi, supra note 17, at 1391 n.54 ("The power of the purse
has been
widely recognized to be a legislative prerogative in English and American history for
many centuries. This, I believe, reflects a central reality about the core of what the
phrase 'the legislative power' actually means and must mean."); see also SAIKRISHNA
PRAKASH, THE ESSENTIAL MEANING OF EXECUTIVE POWER (Univ. of S.D., Sch. of Law,
Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 04, Apr. 2000) (arguing at length that
historical record reveals that executive power includes the power to execute the laws
without addressing what executing the law means).
61 See, e.g., N.W. Barber, Prelude to the Separation of Powers
1 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing "that the essence of separation of
powers is the meeting of form and function; the matching of tasks to those bodies best
suited to execute them").
62 David Currie argues
that:
Article I of the Constitution entrusts the legislative power of the United States
to the Congress, so that democratically elected representatives will determine
national policy. Article 11 vests the executive power in the President, in the interest of unified administration by an elected officer. Article III places the judicial power in judges appointed for life and removable only for high crimes
and misdemeanors, so that cases may be decided without fear of reprisal.
Currie, supra note 9, at 19.
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cial power is vested in the judiciary because its decisionmakers have
protections that assure their independence-lifetime tenure and salary. Following this approach, the objective would be to line up the
power allocation with the reason for the allocation.
These efforts are more promising than some others evaluated
here because, rather than abstractly attempting to define government
functions, they would allocate the functions based on the reasons why
we might want particular kinds of government authority exercised by
differently designed institutions in the first place. Even if more developed, however, these approaches predictably will fall short. Faith that
we could settle on the comparative institutional competencies of the
branches of government seems naive because it aspires to develop
some objective measure of the competency of a branch; but any such
effort would be inevitably intertwined with normative judgments
about which institution should exercise a certain kind of government
authority. Normative disagreements about those matters would not
vanish due to supposed evidence that one branch or another is more
"competent" to perform a particular task. Trying to assign specific exercises of government authority based on the general normative reason for the power allocation-for instance, Congress decides certain
questions because of its particular electoral responsiveness-would
also be likely to fail in any particular case just as the vague efforts at
defining the nondelegation line fail.
These broad-brush efforts to match the institutional competency
or normative suitability of a "branch" with the exercise of a particular
power are destined to fail for a more fundamental reason. As the next
section will argue, the branches are complex entities with many different subparts. Given that reality, it would be an impossible endeavor
to identify a branch'sinstitutional competency or suitability writ large.

Given that we now have no satisfactory definitions of the three
functions of government-and little prospect of developing themcurrent approaches are misdirected. 6 The debate in the courts and
This Article is not alone in challenging conventional approaches to separation
of powers. A group of commentators, one might even call them a revisionist school,
are critical of separation of powers orthodoxy. See supra note 13 (citing sources).
Some in this group explicitly criticize the traditional emphasis on the identification
and separation of the three governmental powers. They argue that such a focus invites
a question-begging analysis, see Merrill, supra note 6, at 245, and fails to capture important values underlying the horizontal constitutional structure, see Nourse, supra note
63
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much of the literature proceeds on the assumption that, in at least
some range of cases, there is a way to classify government authority
into three categories and assure that the functions are exercised by
distinct institutions. But we have no such method now and, given the
options, it makes no sense to reorient our energies to developing evermore-refined ways to classify government authority into one of three
categories. Spending time trying to characterize government authority is just asking the wrong question. The focus of our discussions
should be on conceptualizing separation of powers doctrine in a way
that does not depend so heavily on distinctions among the three governmental functions. Rather than there being a few such efforts, our
law reviews should be filled with them.
B.

Three Balanced Branches

Current thinking about separation of powers is also committed to
some particular allocation of government power among three
branches, or, to put the commitment more colloquially, the preservation of three roughly "balanced" branches of government. 4 This idea
is articulated in a variety of ways: maintaining a balance among coequal departments; 65 or preventing encroachment or aggrandizement
of one department at the expense of another. 6 Concern that a par13, at 751-52. To be sure, none in this revisionist school argue in a sustained way that
we lack a satisfactory method to identify the differences among the three powers. The
critique offered here is thus distinct from these other efforts, as is the proposal offered
in Part II, but this Article should be read as a complement to them.
64 Because of its association with a
contextual, standard-like approach to deciding
particular cases that come before courts, balance is a word that many formalist commentators eschew. See, e.g.,
REDISH, supra note 11, at 125. This section is consistent
with the formalist's critique of a balance-between-the-branches analysis used to decide
individual cases. But the argument here goes beyond the disutility of using such a
standard to decide cases. The critique in this Part is of the basic idea that there must
or can be rough balance among branches of government. This idea operates at a
higher level of abstraction than the decision rules for individual cases and, at that level
at least, it is an idea to which every party in the debate adheres. The disagreement
about how best to implement that idea in particular cases is a separate question. Regardless of how one wishes to implement it in individual cases, the argument of this
section is that the concept is too problematic to be a useful tool of analysis.
65 For academic references, see Calabresi & Rhodes,
supra note 8, at 1216; Cynthia
R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 452, 488-99 (1989); Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1810-21; Froomkin, supra
note 4, at 1374-75; Greene, supra note 4, at 138; Miller, supra note 9, at 54; Strauss, supra note 12, at 522. Forjudicial references, see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,
452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring), Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412
(1989), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
66 See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 4, at 1368 ("Overall,
the Court's decisions fit a
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ticular arrangement may upset the proper balance among the
branches surfaces in a variety of contexts, including the growth of the
s
administrative state,"7 the legislative' and line-item vetoes," the independent counsel,"' and other appointments arrangements." Commitment to the idea of balance arises from an understanding of the
architecture that the Constitution establishes. The idea is that, if the
functions of government are exercised by three different institutions
and the checks by one institution as against the others are maintained,
that arrangement is appealing because it produces three potent institutions that share in the exercise of government power. Unfortunately, the notion of balance is both conceptually underdeveloped
and flawed. This section first clarifies the idea and then raises a series
of objections to it.

pattern in which Congress's power to check the other branches by determining their
structure is very great, but Congress is checked by the requirements that it act through
persons outside the legislature ...and that Congress not aggrandize its own powers.");
Greene, supra note 4, at 158-77 (analyzing various arrangements of congressional and
executive powers through the prism of the anti-aggrandizement principle). The Supreme Court has frequently observed that the structural provisions of the Constitution
are intended to prevent encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 482; Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 273 (1991); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at
382; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 850 (1986); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1,122 (1976).
67 See Flaherty, sulra note 5, at 1820-21 (examining the implications
on the powers
of Congress and the President following the "death of the nondelegation doctrine");
Greene, supra note 4, at 158-62 (discussing congressional efforts to secure a role in the
appointment of executive officials in a "post-nondelegation doctrine world" where "the
presidency has become bloated with legislative power").
N4 Froomkin, supra note 4, at 1368; Greene, supra note 4, at 165.
69 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 451-52 (Kennedy,J., concurring); Powell & Rubenfeld, supra
note 3, at 1196; Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L.
REV. 403, 406-07 (1988); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 390 (1992). But see Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost
Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1605, 1624-25 (1997)
(claiming that "Congress can easily blunt" the legislative power transferred to the
President).
70 Steven G. Calabresi, Some StructuralConsequences of the Increased Use of Ethics Probes
as Political Weapons, 11J.L. & POL. 521, 522 (1995).
71 See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 1368 (asserting that Congress violated the separation of powers by reserving a role in the removal of the postmaster general and comptroller general); Greene, supra note 4, at 164-65 (arguing that congressional power to
remove the comptroller general, who played a role in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
deficit-reduction scheme, meant that Congress had improperly aggrandized its own
powers).
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The first point to be clarified is the relationship between maintaining rough balance among the departments and assuring the institutionally separate exercise of the three government functions. On
one understanding, balance among the departments bears a direct relation to functional separation: in order to guarantee the dispersal of
government functions among three institutions, each institution must
be able to protect the exercise of its function, and it is for that reason
that the branches need to be balanced] 2 This explanation, however,
is partial; it suggests that our commitment to three potent government institutions is solely aimed at the preservation of the separate
exercise of the functions of government. We are committed to balance, however, even where the possible misallocation of the three
functions of government is not at stake. 7 The reason for providing
the President with a veto illustrates the point most easily. If the sole
reason we want the branches to remain roughly balanced is to preserve the dispersal of three government functions in different institutions, then the only reason the President has the veto is to reject bills
that alter the allocation of functions among the departments-those
that purport to strip the President of some executive power, or permit
Congress to exercise judicial power. But the President's veto authority
is understood, at least today, to enable the President to veto bills
based on policy differences with the Congress, not simply claims of
unconstitutional redistribution of the underlying functions of government.4 Thus, maintaining balance among the departments is
72 See Magill, supra note 6, at 1149
(arguing that conventional approaches to separation of powers treat the checks as a way to permit the branches to "protect the exercise of their own functions and check the exercise of functions by the others").
73 See Nourse, supra note 13, at
760-68 (discussing the ways in which balance would
be dramatically altered by changes in institutional design that do not involve any
change in function).
The distinction between use of the veto to prevent unconstitutional action and
use to express policy difference was familiar at the Founding. JACK N. RAKOVE,

ORIGINAL MEANINGS:

POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrUTION 261-

62, 267-68 (1996) (identifying a distinction in the Philadelphia Convention debates
between the ability of the executive to resist legislative encroachments such as efforts
to strip the President of the veto authority, and the ability of the executive to prevent
the adoption of unjust legislation); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 31-32 (1997) (questioning
the
claim that President Washington viewed exercise of veto power as appropriate only on
constitutional grounds, and asserting that, if Washington ever held that view, he had
abandoned it late in his Presidency when he vetoed a bill on policy grounds); THE
FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[The
veto] not only serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes an additional security
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about something more than preserving the allocation of government
functions.
But just what is that something more? Why should we care about
balance among the branches? Oddly enough, current thinking rarely
addresses that question. Discussions of the need to prevent aggrandizement or to preserve balance among the departments assume that
balance among the three branches is an end in itself. Consider a
world in which the President does not have the power to veto bills.
This arrangement, according to the conventional formulation, would
create a dangerous imbalance of power among the branches by aggrandizing Congress at the expense of the President. This conclusion
implies that we care about the weakening of the Presidency for its own
sake .7

The key to understanding concerns about aggrandizement and
the preservation of balance is to notice when we would not care about
it. To risk stating the obvious, we would not be concerned about the
balance of authority among the branches if there were no salient differences among them. That is, if we were absolutely certain that no
matter which branch-or combination of branches-made a decision,
76
and the conclusion reached would be the same, then there would be
against the enaction of improper laws."). Whatever the historical understanding about
the appropriate use of the veto, there is no question that today it is understood to
See CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO
permit the expression of policy difference.
BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF NEGATIVE POWER 33-68 (2000) (presenting empirical evidence indicating that the veto power has been used primarily to
express policy difference); LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS
AND THE EXECUTIVE 28-32 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing the role of the veto in asserting
policy difference).
n Commentators have noticed the Supreme Court's tendency to engage in this
sort of analysis. See Brown, supra note 13, at 1518 (" U] udicial opinions addressing the
separation of powers.., tend to place primary emphasis not on the prevention of tyranny or protection of individual liberties, but on the advancement of the institutional
interests of the branches themselves, as if that goal were itself a good-a proposition
with no historical support." (footnote omitted)); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 8, at
115 (asserting that Supreme Court caselaw reflects a distinction between improper
congressional aggrandizement over administrative agencies and proper protection of
those agencies' independence, but lamenting that the Court's explanation of this distinction "sometimes reads like a kind of 'turf protection' model").
76 I focus here on expected differences in outcome produced by an institutional
arrangement because that is the best way to understand the cases where claims about
aggrandizement or balance are made. One might make claims about balance or aggrandizement with respect to what are regarded as an analytically distinct set of concerns about the normative suitability (Congress should make a certain set of decisions
because of its particular electoral accountability, or electorally insulated judges should
decide disputes between individuals as to the meaning of law) or institutional competency (the President as a single head of state is most suited to take a dominant role in
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little reason to be concerned about the allocation of decisionmaking
authority among them. To take one example, if we knew that the
President's ability to exercise the veto had no effect whatsoever, we
would not care if the President no longer had the veto. The commitment to rough balance among the branches is thus best understood as
based on the assumption that actors in different parts of government
will not decide questions in the same way, that there will be some systematic differences in their decisionmaking."
It is worth observing that an assumption that the branches will
reach systematically different outcomes is open to challenge. Behavioralist literature, now out of vogue in the wake of the so-called "new
institutionalism," asserts that people and their ideology matter most,
and that people of similar ideologies will systematically reach the same
outcomes regardless of their institutional placement. 8 The debate
about whether Article III courts act in a countermajoritarian fashion
can also be understood in this context. Advocates of the claim that
the Supreme Court rarely acts in a countermajoritarian way are of the
view that the Court does not make dramatically different decisions
than the electorally accountable branches of government."
Concern that an arrangement will aggrandize one branch at the
expense of another implicitly rejects the idea that the institutions of
the national government are interchangeable. Instead, as just observed, worries about balance are rooted in the intuition that the
branches are importantly different and that is why the distribution of

foreign relations) of the branches to perform certain tasks. Such concerns are conventionally thought to have significance independent of outcome. Whether these concerns operate entirely independently of expected outcome differences, the point here
is that, while these concerns could be invoked in terms of aggrandizement or balance,
they usually travel under claims about the mixing of finctions, the commitment analyzed in Part I.A. Thus, for example, adjudication of individualized disputes by administrative agencies might be understood as aggrandizement of the executive branchand, if so, the understanding of aggrandizement contained in the text is too narrowbut the debate is instead about the dangers of altering the functional allocation, that
is, of executive-branch judges adjudicating federal-law disputes and thereby
inappropriately exercising the judicial power.
I take this to be the central insight of Victoria Nourse's piece, Vertical Sel)aration,
supra note 13. See id. at 792 ("Vertical analysis... assumes that the departments are
different because they represent different constituencies.").
78 For an abbreviated summary of
behavioralist approaches, see Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralistApproaches toJudicial Politics, 25 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 601, 604-07 (2000).
79 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (1991); Michael J. Karman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1996).
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authority among them matters. Return to the example of the presidential veto. The argument for the existence of the veto-that its existence "balances" the power of Congress-assumes that Congress and
the President together will reach a different set of outcomes than
Congress by itself would reach, and of course that the distinctive effect
that the President's involvement adds to decisions is valuable. Understood in this way, balance or policing aggrandizement are not metaphysical commitments to three institutions in equipoise, but rather
are about protecting a particular allocation of decisionmaking authority among departments that will decide questions differently.
The branches will decide questions differently only if the incentives of the actors in the three branches are systematically different.
This operating assumption is usually unstated and, consequently, its
contours are undeveloped; the literature does not usually contain a
description of the different incentives or a demonstration that they
exist.80 I will argue soon that an effort to demonstrate the existence of
systematically different incentives or, what is more important, to predict the consequence of any such differences, is likely to fail given the
monumental complexity of the task. For the moment, however, notice the nature of the assumption. Intuitions about salient interbranch differences must be rooted in the distinct organization of, and
relationship among, the institutions-decisionmakers with varying
electoral and tenure regimes who are charged with the exercise of a
distinct mix of governmental functions. Consider the example of the
line-item veto. One common claim is that the line-item veto aggrandizes the President."' This claim has two parts: the line-item veto will

80

A few commentators recently have begun to focus explicitly on the incentives of

the actors in the different branches. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments
far the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 34-35 (1995) (describing the President as a
safeguard against "the bad distributional incentives" of Congress); Fitzgerald, supra
note 13, at 753 (noting that Congress's constituency is local or statewide in character,
while the President's "is national in both scope and in character"); Nourse, supra note
13, at 758 ("Any complete understanding of shifting power must grapple with the political incentives that constitutive power creates.").
s See Calvin Bellamy, Item Veto: Shield Against Deficits or Weapon of Presidential
Power?, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 557, 581-87 (1988) (concluding that the item veto expands
the legislative powers of the President by allowing him to implement his own spending
agenda); Powell & Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1196 (noting the argument that "the
Line Item Veto Act gives the President the power to rewrite legislation" and thus violates the general principle of separation of powers); Robinson, supra note 69, at 413
(noting that "almost everyone sees the item veto as the source of increased executive
power"); Stearns, supra note 69, at 401 ("[T]he item veto would rework a fundamental
shift in the balance of power, providing the President with powerful opportunities to
influence the direction and shape of legislative priorities, while affording him surpris-
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change outcomes; and those outcome differences are to be lamented.
The outcomes would be different because the President and the Congress would have systematically different reactions to spending and tax
choices. Any such systematic differences would have to spring from a
complicated set of internal and external factors, including the type of
individuals who populate the executive branch and the Congress, the
internal norms of those bodies, and the different constituencies that
influence them. Discussions of the line-item veto tend to focus only
on the last of these factors; allegedly, certain constituencies will have
more sway with the President than with Congress, and others will have
more sway with Congress than with the President. The putative variation in the responsiveness to constituencies relevant to the line-item
veto runs as follows: the President will care more about national constituencies and less about localized constituencies than the Congress
will.8 2 Hence, the President will not veto an item that has the strong
support of a national constituency, but may veto provisions that a localized constituency was able to persuade a minimum-winning coalition in Congress to support. And why should that outcome difference
be lamented? Those opposed to the veto do not want the executive
interest to prevail more often than it would without the veto; more
concretely, they do not want the national constituencies with more influence with the President to be advantaged and the more localized
constituencies with more influence with the Congress to be disadvantaged.

Understanding claims about balance and aggrandizement in this
way helpfully redirects attention away from abstract notions about
keeping the three institutions magically balanced for their own sake.
The redirection, however, does not transform these ideas into useful
tools of analysis. On the contrary, it is a hopeless enterprise to talk
about the balance or imbalance among the branches of government,
and it is one that should be abandoned.
If balance among the branches should be understood to be about
the appropriate distribution of government decisionmaking authority

ingly little opportunity to excise the dreaded pork.").
82 See Calabresi, supra note 80,
at 78-79 (comparing the local incentives of Congress with the "national, anti-factional" concerns of the President); Robinson, supra
note 69, at 411 ("The intuition may be that because of the President's nationwide constituency he is held specially accountable for the fate of general enactments ....).
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among institutions that have different ways of making decisions, what
is the proper distribution? How we could or should answer this question is left entirely undeveloped in conventional accounts. Answering
this question requires at least three levels of analysis, each one vexing
in its own right. We would need a benchmark of the appropriate distribution of authority among the branches that could be used to determine whether a change in their relationship to one another is impermissible; we would need a way to define, measure, and compare
government power across institutions exercising different types of
authority; and finally, we would need the ability to understand and
predict the way in which a new institutional arrangement would alter
the relationship between the branches. Consider again the line-item
veto. To decide whether that device would inappropriately empower
the President at the expense of the Congress, we would need to predict whether and how the existence of the veto would affect the relationship between those branches. We would then need to determine
whether any change violated an agreed-upon benchmark of the
proper distribution of authority among the institutions. Answering
that question would require both that we settle on such a benchmark,
and also that we be able to evaluate the comparative power of the institutions. We are not now equipped to answer these questions, and
we never will be.
Before further examining the difficulties with the idea of balance,
however, it is worth noting that the aggrandizement inquiry does not
avoid these questions. At first blush, it appears more helpful than the
balancing formulation because there seems to be no need to measure
the quantum of power held by different institutions or to settle on a
benchmark of proper allocation that could be used in assessing each
arrangement. One just has to be able to detect whether one of the
branches will be empowered-in the sense that it will have an improved ability to affect outcomes 53-- by the arrangement. In fact,
however, the aggrandizement inquiry does take a stand on the appropriate allocation of authority among the branches, and obviously so.
Aggrandizement is only a meaningful concept when it can be compared to a baseline. And the usual formulation (consistent with the
connotation of the word used) is that a device that aggrandizes a
branch is invalid. But to say that aggrandizement is disfavored is just
to say that the previous baseline is preferable. The reason for always
8.3 As I soon make clear, deciding whether a branch is empowered
is a tricky question. Infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. For now, please accept this working
definition.
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preferring that baseline should be defended, but it cannot be. The
allocation of authority among the branches is not static, but fluid, s"
and at any point in time there is no reason systematically to prefer the
status quo ante of authority. Once we step away from an antiaggrandizement rule that always defends the existing allocation of
authority, however, we need to decide whether an arrangement that
aggrandizes one department is desirable. That question, however,just
returns us to the basic difficulties of the balancing formulation.
Critics who invoke the ideas of balance or aggrandizement do not
supply helpful frameworks for answering any of these questions. Recall that there are three questions that must be considered: normatively, what is the proper distribution of authority among the
branches; descriptively, what is the distribution of authority among
the branches at a particular point in time; and predictively, how will a
particular institutional arrangement alter the relationship among
those branches?
By itself, the normative question might stop us in our tracks. We
are unlikely ever to reach agreement on some ideal distribution of
authority among the branches. Even if we narrowed the question
considerably-for instance, should the Congress or the executive have
the dominant role in controlling the domestic economy during times
of economic dislocation?-it does not seem likely that we could soon
reach a consensus. Still, it might be worth the effort to develop such a
baseline if we could answer the other two questions. If we had a way
to discern the distribution of authority at any point in time, and a way
to predict the effect of particular arrangements, then articulating an
appropriate distribution of authority might be a worthy endeavor. But
the surprising news is that, even if we reached agreement on the nor-

8, Although there is no agreement on the shape of the fluidity, no
one seems to
think that the allocation of authority among the branches remains stable across time.
Calabresi, supra note 80, at 33-39; Froomkin, supra note 4, at 1375. Some argue that, in
this century, the executive has become excessively powerful in relation to the other
branches of government. See Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1816-21 (documenting the rise
of the executive branch's power relative to Congress); Greene, supra note 4, at 134
(noting "the simple and incontestable fact that the post-New Deal presidency has substantially greater policy-making power than the pre-New Deal presidency, both in absolute terms and relative to Congress"). Others argue that the executive has been relatively weakened because of limitations on the President's ability to control those
nominally in the executive branch. See Calabresi, supra note 80, at 31-33 (noting the
argument that "Congress has used its power to structure the cabinet departments and
agencies in ways that make it very difficult for the President to oversee and control
them, most especially by making certain officers independent and removable only 'for
cause"').
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mative question, the other two questions still would be unanswerable.
Examine first the need to discern the quantum of power held by
an institution and to compare it to the amount of power held by other
institutions Claims that an arrangement will--or will not-increase
the power of one branch at the expense of another are common in
separation of powers cases and commentary.5 One set of critics, for
instance, maintains that the executive branch has accumulated excessive power.
These critics argue that contested constitutional arrangements like the legislative veto, line-item veto, and appointments
regimes must be viewed through the prism of a now-dominant executive branch."7 But these accounts rely on the concepts of imbalance
and aggrandizement without identifying what they mean.
Consider the most developed of the arguments in this vein.
Professor Martin Flaherty argues that we have shifted from
congressional government to presidential government, with the executive, instead of Congress, dominating the scene. He points to
important changes over time in a variety of areas: presidential
control of law enforcement, dominance in foreign affairs, and energetic initiation of legislative proposals."" But for Flaherty, and for oth8. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) ("The dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized."); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) ("[T]he carefully defined limits on the power of
each Branch must not be eroded."); Froomkin, supra note 4, at 1368-69 (explaining
separation of powers cases as permitting appropriate congressional regulation of the
executive in order to respond to the growth of presidential power, but not permitting
such regulation if it aggrandizes Congress, because that would lead to too much congressional power); Greene, supra note 4, at 158-77 (same).
See, e.g., William N. Eskidge,Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section
7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523, 533 (1992) ("[The] shift to agency lawmaking has been accompanied by
an overall shift of lawmaking authority from Congress to the President."); Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1821 ("[E]ven the most glancing survey indicates that the executive
branch long ago supplanted its legislative counterpart as the most powerful-and
therefore most dangerous--in the sense that the Founders meant."); Froomkin, supra
note 4, at 1375 (noting that although some authors disagree, he, and others, "continue
to see an imperial Presidency"); Greene, supra note 4, at 153-55 (noting the expansion
of presidential power in the post-nondelegation era).
87 See Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1832-39 (criticizing
"the Court's historically novel
forays into separation of powers" and emphasizing that "[firom the perspective of
changed circumstances... the outcome of those sallies has been even worse");
Greene, supra note 4, at 154 ("[W]e must evaluate twentieth-century congressional
framework legislation in light of the great twentieth-century giveaway of legislative
power.... [F]or the essential balance of powers to be maintained, the President himself must now be checked."); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 86, at 533 ("If the
Court is truly serious about the Framers' original expectations ... the Court should be
more attentive to the ways in which agency lawmaking unsettles those expectations.").
89 Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1817-19.
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ers,8 the most obvious shift toward presidential power, and away from
Congress, has been the creation and judicial acceptance of the administrative state. As Flaherty observes:
With the New Deal, and the attendant death of the nondelegation doctrine, the giveaway of what had been seen as legislative authority (or
something close) became massive .... At least as important as the scope
of modern delegation, however, is to whom the power has been dele-

gated. If there has been any net beneficiary of Congress's abdication of
authority, it has been the President.... [A] substantial measure of
power that under the nondelegation doctrine would by definition have
90
resided in Congress has since fallen to the President.

For Flaherty and others,91 doctrinal prescriptions arise out of this
shift in power from Congress to the executive. At a minimum, Flaherty maintains, Congress must be permitted "to maintain some control over the authority the Court now permits it to delegate away to
the administrative state. '2
Flaherty provides no explanation of how he measures the power
of a branch of government, much less how he makes comparative assessments between the executive and the legislature. Examine first
the claim that the executive is more powerful than it used to be. Of
course, the executive has grown; it does more things than it used to;
the nature of the Presidency has changed. But this falls short of demonstrating that the executive is more powerful than it used to be; the
relevant question is about the relative power of the executive. 3 Flaherty does not examine external factors, even though doing so is necessary to understanding the relative power of the President. At a
minimum, one must understand the President in relation to other
governmental actors, including the other branches of the federal government, and the relationship between the executive and state gov-

89

Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 86, at 533; Greene, supra note 4, at 154.

90 Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1820-21.

See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 86, at 534-47 (analyzing the three ways
Congress has attempted to offset pro-President bias in agency lawmaking: "the legislative veto of agency rulemaking, delegation of responsibilities to congressionallydominated agents, and procedural checks on agency rulemaking"); Greene, supra note
4, at 171-77 (discussing Congress's Court-approved ability to "regulate the removal of
agency personnel, to ensure that the President does not control all the power delegated away from Congress").
92 Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1821.
0 For rich description and nuanced analysis of the factors that help
shape presidential power, see CHARLES O.JONES, THE PRESIDENCY IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (1994);
and RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1990).
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ernments. In addition, nongovernmental factors such as economic,
social, and international developments also affect the relative power
of the President." If one could take account of all these factors, perhaps the executive has the same relative power that it used to have,
even though that power, when considered in isolation, has grown.
The need for a more refined definition of power is even clearer
when one focuses on the claims that one branch of the national government is more powerful than another. One common assumption
behind these claims is that government power is a zero-sum product:
if the power meter registers an increase in the executive branch, it at
the same time registers a decrease in the legislative branch. 5 But that
cannot be right. Arrangements could weaken, or strengthen, different branches at the same time. One might say that the office of the
independent counsel weakened both the President and Congress by
96
heightening voters' dislike for politicians. The prime example that
Flaherty and others rely on, the growth of the administrative state,
provides the best example of the error of the zero-sum assumption.
The creation of the administrative state has increased the overall
authority of the federal government, to the benefit of both the President and the Congress.
Even accepting that the President and Congress have both benefited from the creation of administrative agencies, one might still
claim, as Flaherty does, that the President is the "net beneficiary" of
this development.9 7 Notice at the outset that the claim is counterintuitive. It asserts that Congress densely gave away its power to the executive without an equivalent benefit to itself. But this has to be a mis94 SeeJONES, supra note 93, at 282-83 (concluding that the "substantial differences
in the personal and political background of presidents and how they come to serve in
the White House ...can lead to strategies... that aid in explaining performance in
office"); NEUSTADT, supra note 93, at 3-9, 183-229 (discussing various social, economic,
and international factors that had bearings on the demonstration of power by modem
Presidents).
95 Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1819-21 (stating that with the decline of the
nondelegation doctrine the President has become the "net beneficiary of Congress's abdication of authority"); Greene, supra note 4, at 154-55 (arguing that if Congress begins to
delegate its broad legislative powers to the executive branch, then the President must
be checked to maintain the balance of powers); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra
note 86, at 533 (noting that the "shift to agency lawmaking has been accompanied by
an overall shift of lawmaking authority from Congress to the President").
96 See Calabresi, supra note 80, at 93-94 (noting that the existence of the
Independent Counsel inevitably leads to more frequent and politicized investigations,
which "encourages an excessive distrust of the government and of government officials, and it prevents government from addressing the real problems of the nation").
97 Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1819, 1821.
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taken understanding of why Congress delegates; the ability to delegate
provides many advantages to Congress: How we could discern that
the President got the best of the bargain is unknown. The claim assumes the existence of an imagined tool that can identify which
branch is more powerful. But what that tool measures, and how it
does so, is left unstated. One potential understanding of this instrument is that it simply measures how often one branch prevails over
another, which is probably the best approximation of what commentators mean when they rely on the sorts of claims evaluated here. More
precisely, claims that one branch has been aggrandized or weakened
in comparison to another seem implicitly to assume that the ability of
the institution to achieve its preferred outcomes when the branches
are pitted against one another is the appropriate measure of the balance of power between them. If this is a correct understanding of
what courts and commentators implicitly mean when they argue that
one branch has been strengthened in relation to another, it is worth
noting that none of those invoking these ideas demonstrate that one
branch or another has achieved its preferred outcomes more often.
For instance, while Professor Flaherty argues that the executive has
become the "most dangerous branch," he does not demonstrate that
the outcomes preferred by the executive prevail over outcomes preferred by the legislature more often than they used to, much less the
further claim that the executive prevails more often than it should. ''
Measuring the changing frequency of branch victories is one way
to measure the comparative power of institutions, and it is the measure I will examine hereafter. But at the outset, notice that this way of
measuring inter-institutional power is limited. This method assumes
that the salient time one should measure the power of the branches is
when they are in some sort of conflict. It is only then that one can see
that two institutions have different preferred outcomes, and that one
or the other has prevailed. Presumably, conflict means those highprofile moments with which we are familiar: judicial determinations
whether a statute is constitutional; battles over vetoes and overrides;
nomination or treaty fights; and impeachment controversies. But
98See

D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW

DELEGATION:

D. MCCUBBINS,

THE LOGIC OF

CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS

167-85

(1991) (rejecting the "abdication hypothesis" and arguing, through study of legislative
delegation of budgeting authority to the President, that Congress delegates to the executive in order to better achieve its own policy objectives); Peter H. Aranson et al., A
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 37-62 (1982) (describing how
delegation by Congress can facilitate the collective provision of private goods).
_ Flaherty, supra note
5.
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what if we are in a period where no such conflict exists among the
branches? Under this way of measuring power, there are no data
points to count. But the lack of such conflicts could mean that one
branch is so dominant that neither of the other branches is willing to
challenge it in any way.
Counting only these high-profile conflicts may also miss other important parts of the picture. If the President's veto is sustained three
out of four times, does that mean that the President is more powerful
than the Congress? What if, in the same period when the President's
vetoes are largely sustained, the executive's efforts to initiate or shape
legislative proposals are dead letters in Congress? The executive's
failure is relevant to the relationship between the President and legislature, but the developments are unlikely to produce a neatly measurable outcome. Moreover, attaching significance to these high-profile
1 l°
If the President is impeached, or the
events can be misplaced.
President's Supreme Court nominee is rejected, does either event
mean anything systematic about the balance of power between the two
branches? The impeachment may mean something about a particular
President, and the rejection of the nominee may mean something
about judicial politics at a point in time, but they may not tell us anything generalizable about the relationship between those institutions.
Finally, it seems unlikely that these data points, as crude as they are,
would easily yield an answer about which branch is more powerful.
Imagine that the President wins three out of four veto overrides in a
certain period. At the same time, Congress is conducting an investigation into corruption in parts of the executive branch, and the resulting disclosures lead to the resignation of senior officials in several departments, thus hampering the President's effort to launch a major
initiative. During the same period, too, three out of four of the executive's efforts to interpret important statutes-through rulemaking-have been invalidated in the courts. Even this unrealistically
simple example-in terms of the events worth counting-suggests that
evaluating that data would be an impossible task.
Despite the many inadequacies of this measure, assume that the
best way to measure the comparative power of institutions is to discern
how often the outcomes preferred by one of them occur. Having settled for the moment on a way to measure the comparative power of
I00

See REBECCA KC. HERSMAN, FRIENDS AND FOES:

How CONGRESS AND THE

PRESIDENT REALLY MAKE FOREIGN POLICY 3-9 (2000) (arguing that an emphasis on
high-profile events in congressional/executive relations in the area of foreign policy
gives a distorted picture of those relations).
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the branches of government, we have a working answer for one of
those vexing questions. Even so, relying on this measure to evaluate
institutional arrangements is problematic. There is, of course, the
lurking and daunting normative question about what the distribution
of authority should be. But there is a difficulty independent of this; we
cannot predict with any confidence whether outcomes will be
changed as the result of a new arrangement.
An extreme case illustrates the prediction problem. Consider the
following arrangement, where it seems easy to claim that some outcome difference will result: freeing the President of the need to gain
the Senate's approval for treaties and nominations. Given that the
President would no longer have to care about the views of the Senate
in these contexts, the arrangement would "aggrandize" the President
at the expense of the Senate. Recall that this concern about aggrandizement has two parts: the prediction that the President's new-found
freedom from Senate approval would mean that he would enter into
treaties and make nominations that he otherwise would not; and the
judgment that such an outcome difference would be regrettable.
Surely, this is a case where the first of these claims, that outcomes
would be changed, is correct.
Even this supposedly easy case is tricky. Whether outcomes
change as a result of freeing the President of this requirement depends on two factors: the significance one ascribes to the rule requiring advice and consent; and the existence of systematically different
preferences between the President and the Senate. Ascribing great
significance to the rule risks exaggerating its effect. It may be that the
President would take account of the Senate's views even if the Senate
did not formally have the authority to reject nominees and treaties.'0 '
This is because there are other features of the relationship between
the Senate and the President that would provide the President with
the incentive to care about the views of the Senate. Even if the Senate
did not retain its advice and consent function, the Senate's approval
would be necessary for legislation, the Senate would participate in
veto overrides, and, more remotely, the Senate would have a role to
play in impeachment. Given that the Senate would have the power
through these mechanisms to retaliate against the President for a
treaty or nomination that the Senate collectively strongly opposed, the
President might take account of the Senate's views even without the
101Cf Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE
PRESIDENT 33 (4th ed. 1997) (noting that Senators may be able to block an appointment even in cases that do not require advice and consent and citing an example).
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advice and consent requirement. There are also informal relationships that would give the President the incentive to take some account
of the Senate's views. Political party relationships, regional affiliations, and personal relationships all create ties between at least some
Senators and the President such that the President might be expected
to take account of their views. The President thus might still consult
with the Senate on these matters, or at least hesitate to sign treaties or
make nominations that the Senate would strongly oppose, for fear
that the President would feel the effects of such a decision in other
areas of the President-Senate relationship.
Notice further that the set of cases where the outcome might
change by elimination of the Senate's advice and consent functionthat is, where the treaty or nominee would have been rejected, or not
proposed in the first place, if Senate approval were necessary-is likely
to be relatively small. The cases where the outcome could be different
without Senate advice and consent are those cases where there are systematic differences in the views of the President and the Senate.
Here, of course, is the assumption at the root of concerns about aggrandizement. But that assumption is problematic. Of course there
are many differences between the branches, but demonstrating that
those differences are systematic, and that their effect can thus be predicted, is difficult.
Consider this in the context of the advice and consent example.
The factors that influence the Senate and the executive on policy
questions are often not systematically differentiated. Treaties and
nominations are events that particular groups, and their representatives in government organizations and interest groups, care about. If
the treaty relates to human rights, a predictable mix of interest groups
will present their views on the treaty, and these groups are likely to
have some influence with both the executive and the Congress. There
may be periods in time where there are systematic differences in interest groups' ability to influence decisions in the executive and the
Senate, and that fact will produce cases where there will be differences
in views between the executive and the Senate. But, although this is a
complicated question, it seems most probable that such differences
will relate to ideology-for instance, one party controlling Congress
and another controlling the executive. If that is the case, such differences will not be stable across time and cannot be used as a basis for
predicting the effect of an arrangement.

102

It is a common intuition that there are systematic differences between the
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My claim here is not that eliminating the Senate's advice and consent would be irrelevant to outcomes. The effort, rather, is to test our
ability to predict outcome difference in a supposedly easy case. Even
in that case, it is not obvious that we can predict a significant outcome
difference-that is, that we will have many treaties and nominees that
we would not otherwise have had. And even if we are convinced that
outcomes would be changed by this hypothetical arrangement, certainty about this case is of no help in predicting outcome differences
in other cases. Whether outcomes will be altered as a result of typically contested cases is even murkier.
Consider, for example, the common claim that the line-item veto
strengthens the President at the expense of Congress.'0 3 This claim is
dependent, like the advice and consent example, upon systematically
different views between the two actors. Put aside the complications
just raised about this assumption and accept that those differences exist. The claim is that, as a result of the line-item veto, certain outcomes systematically favored by Presidents (and disfavored by Congress) will be achieved that would not be achieved without the lineitem veto. But is that so? Even with the line-item veto, Congress designs the legislative package that it sends to the President and it
should have at least some ability to predict the President's reaction to
branches, differences that spring from institutional placement and thus are stable over
time. Such differences would be the basis for a claim that a change in the allocation of
decisionmaking authority would change outcomes. To support that claim, many
would point to the different views that officials hold depending on their institutional
placement. It is true, when the question relates to the prerogatives of the office, that
institutional placement has a predictable influence on the views of the office occupants. Most Presidents have expansive views of executive power, and most members of
Congress have expansive views of the investigative powers of the Congress. See FISHER,
supra note 101, at 160-95 (describing conflicts between the Congress and the President
over access to information). That these sorts of differences in view exist, however, does
not mean that there will be differences in outcome if decisionmaking authority is reallocated. No Senator would want the advice and consent reqtirement eliminated; it
does not follow that eliminating it would lead to materially different outcomes.
103 Some applaud this strengthening
of the President; others lament it. See
Calabresi, supra note 80, at 78-81 (supporting the line-item veto because it would counteract congressional tendency to channel resources to individual districts that are inefficient and paid for by the nation as a whole). But see Bellamy, supra note 81, at 590-91
("The item veto would change the balance-dramatically increasing the President's
influence and control over the agenda of government and at the same time proportionally weakening Congress' ability to influence spending .... [Pirudence would
suggest avoidance of structural tinkering."); Stearns, supra note 69, at 401, 418-20 (arguing that the line-item veto shifts the balance of power, thereby "providing the President with powerful opportunities to influence the direction and shape of legislative
priorities, while affording him surprisingly little opportunity to excise the dreaded
pork [barrel legislation]").
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proposals contained in such packages. If these two things are true,
then, as Professor Glen Robinson has pointed out, Congress can extract a promise from the President that if Congress includes a provision that the President favors, the President, in turn, will not veto the
10 4
provision that the coalition in Congress wants to include in the bill.
The President can, of course, go back on that promise, but not very
often.
The difficulty of predicting the effect of an arrangement goes further than this. The mechanism by which the change in outcome will
occur is usually unspecified. Consider, for instance, the claim that the
05
independent counsel weakens the executive.' Concretely, the claim
must be that the President will not be able to achieve outcomes that
he might otherwise achieve. But by what mechanism will the President's inability to control the appointment and removal of an independent counsel investigating high-level illegality prevent the President from exercising his authority in ways that he otherwise would?
Will the President's inability to control the independent prosecutor
somehow make the President unlikely to exercise the veto in the way
he otherwise would, or hesitant to propose domestic policy initiatives?
That is what critics of the independent counsel have in mind, but such
claims seem speculative, at best. The existence of the independent
counsel does not change the underlying incentives the President has
to exercise his prerogatives in particular ways. Those incentives spring
from a complex set of factors, including, at a minimum, the President's ideology, the line-up of the affected constituencies, the salience
of the issues, and the timing within the election cycle. How an independent counsel changes those factors is obscure.
The independent counsel illustrates yet another difficulty with determining whether an arrangement leads to a changed relationship
between the branches. Assume, for the moment, that we have a tool
that discerns whether outcomes will change as a result of an arrangement and that we could see that the outcome change systematically
favored one branch. At what point in time should we measure the fortunes of the branch? Assuming that there is a mechanism by which
Robinson, supra note 69, at 417-18.
lo5 See Calabresi, supra note 80, at 93-94 (noting that the existence of the Inde104

pendent Counsel inevitably leads to more frequent and politicized investigations and
that the existence of such investigations "encourages an excessive distrust of the government and of government officials, and it prevents government from addressing the
real problems of the nation"); Calabresi, supra note 70, at 523-24 ("[T]he net effect of
[Independent Counsel investigations] is to weaken the presidency relative to Congress.").
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the creation of an independent counsel will affect the President's actions, there may be a difference in the short-term and the long-term
effect of an arrangement.' ° Perhaps, initially, removing the appearance of self-interested investigation of high-level illegal activity
through the mechanism of the independent counsel has actually
strengthened the Presidency. But, in the long term, such a device
might weaken the Presidency by inevitably leading to more investigations that distract officials and-though this seems to me highly speculative-chill the robust assertion of presidential prerogatives."07 Administrative agencies provide another example of this shortterm/long-term problem. In the short run, the creation of the administrative state may have strengthened Congress because the agencies
were viewed as creatures of Congress. But, as these agencies have
come to be viewed as parts of the executive branch, it may be that the
administrative state has strengthened the Presidency.'l8

The final difficulty with claims about the comparative power of
the branches of government is the deepest. An important assumption
embedded in the inquiry is that it is sensible to think about a branch
being aggrandized, or branches being balanced. As noted earlier, stating that a branch is dangerously aggrandized by a particular arrangement is tantamount to saying that the systematic outcomes-and constituencies-favored by that branch are more likely to result. This
assumption-that there are branch-specific interests-supports the
claims that particular devices will create an imbalance of power
among the branches. It also supports the more generalized claims
1o6Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions,
86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 226768 (1998) (arguing that "[t]he Independent Counsel Act is a case study in the law of
unintended consequences" since it "was designed to increase trust in government...
[but] actually reduces trust in government, not because of serious misconduct on the
part of high-level officials, but because of scandal mongering, and because of the transformation of political disputes into criminal allegations").
107 See Calabresi, supra note 80,
at 92-95 (arguing that the creation of the Independent Counsel led to more frequent and more politicized investigations); Calabresi,
supra note 70, at 523-24 (urging that the presidency is weakened relative to Congress
by Independent Counsel investigations).
108 See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration,
114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2272-315
(2001) (recounting the successful efforts of modem Presidents, especially President
Clinton, to assert control over administration); Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics:
The Transformationof American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 745, 750-72 (1996)
(tracing the history of agency rulemaking from 1946 and demonstrating the executive
branch's increasing effort and ability to control agency policymaking).
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that the executive is the "net beneficiary" of changes over time. The
relevant units of measurement are the branches of government and
they are assumed to have unitary interests. To illustrate with a specific
example, the claim that the legislative branch is aggrandized by the
legislative veto is to say that there is an identifiable legislative-branch
interest that, with the addition of the legislative veto, will prevail more
often than it otherwise would.
But talking about branches of government as if they have unitary
interests is fantasy. We know that they are not unitary entities with
identifiable branch-specific interests. They are complex institutions
that are made up of many subparts; those subparts have varying inter'°9
This is of course
ests that do not always coincide with one another.
something we know: there are heated intra-institutional battles within
the Congress and the executive branch, and, likewise, there is collaboration across branches of government when the interests of the subparts of those institutions coincide." There are numerous theories
See generally MICHAEL FOLEY & JOHN E. OWENS, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY:
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (1996) (exploring the changes in
Congress and the presidency in the recent decades in the context of other political
developments and the importance of institutions within the political system);
HERSMAN, supra note 100, at 5-6 (noting how "institutional fragmentation and ideological polarization sharply limit strong institutional leadership over foreign policy"
and that "[s]uch individualism on the part of members of Congress is not new");
HENRYJ. MERRY, FIVE-BRANCH GOVERNMENT: THE FULL MEASURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHECKS AND BALANCES 7 (1980) (explaining that the "belief that the branches are
monolithic entities.., is far from the actual condition of things"); HAROLD SEIDMAN,
POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER: THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATION 217 (5th
ed. 1998) (arguing that "in the choice of institutional types and structural and procedural arrangements, we are making decisions with significant political implications").
110See, e.g., ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTERJ. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AGAINST ITSELF
(1979) (analyzing the battle over procedural reform in the House of Representatives
and demonstrating intra-branch disagreement); HERSMAN, supra note 100, at 7-8, 65,
83 (describing the role of cross-institutional collaboration and intra-branch disagreeHOW
ment in foreign policy case studies); DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS:
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 105-147 (1997) (studying in depth
the intra-branch battles within Congress over committee jurisdiction); MERRY, supra
note 109, at 10, 24, 33-34 (noting that subunits of executive and legislative branches,
along with relevant interest groups, collaborate with one another); JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 202-05 (1989)
(noting that the key to agency officers' success is location of external constituencies
wherever they may be found, including key committees and members in Congress,
other parts of the executive, or important interest groups); Daryl J. Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 345, 356 (2000) (observing that government is a multilayered collection of politicians and bureaucrats with different, and often conflicting, goals and agendas); Nelson
Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 491-96, 502
(1993) (recounting disputes between subparts of the Department of Justice and be109
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that support the basic point that the branches of government are not
monolithic entities, and legions of examples that confirm the claim.
Consider the most well known of the phenomena supporting the
point: although the precise nature and effect of the relationships are
the subject of debate, there is little doubt that there are cross-branch
alliances between administrative agencies and the congressional
committees that have jurisdiction over them, alliances fed and supported by the constituencies that are the objects of regulation by those
government actors.'2 Such cross-branch alliances sometimes mean
that subparts of the two branches will work together toward common
goals; this is so even though those goals might be opposed by other
subparts of the institutions and are not endorsed by the larger institution within which those subunits operate.
The fact that branches are not singularly motivated entities, but
rather are an amalgam of distinct entities and/or shifting coalitions
that are not animated solely by their location in a particular branch
makes claims about strengthening or weakening a "branch" problematic. First, the complexity of these instiftutions further compounds the
difficulty of predicting anything systematic about the outcome effects
of an institutional arrangement. An extreme example illustrates the
point. If the Senate, rather than the President, had the power to remove Cabinet secretaries, one could argue that a particular institution-the Senate-would be strengthened. '3 But what that would

tween the Department of Justice and the White House); Theodora Galacatos, Note,
The United States Department ofJustice Environmental Crimes Section. A Case Study of Interand Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 64 FORDmFAM L. REV. 587, 628-52 (1995) (describing inter-branch and intrabranch disagreement over environmental crime programs).
I For instance, the common rational choice model that
explains bureaucratic
behavior assumes that agency policymakers will seek, above all, to maximize the size of
the agency's budget. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 159 (1971). Perhaps the most famous empirical regularity supporting
the argument in the text is the so-called "iron triangle" among congressional committees, agency officials, and the constituent interests that are the target of regulation by
those committees and agencies. See, e.g., FOLEY & OWENS, supra note 109, at 208
(commenting on the "iron triangle" as evocative of a "permanent sub-government, independent of presidential direction, resistant to unacceptable change and largely
autonomous in nature"); MERRY, supra note 109, at 80-86 (arguing that the specialinterest alliances composing an iron triangle are fundamental to policymaking).
112 FOLEY & OWENS, supra note 109,
at 208-09; MERRY, supra note 109, at 80-86;
WILSON, supra note 110, at 251-52.
113 The example is based on the Tenure in Office Act of 1867, which forbade the
removal of certain Cabinet officers without the consent of the Senate. Tenure in Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867). AndrewJohnson, of course, was impeached for
defying the Act by discharging the Secretary of War without Senate approval. See gener-
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mean in terms of outcome effects is difficult to predict. Given that the
Senate is made up of individuals with differing motivations and interests, and that its membership is not static over time, that strengthening may not mean anything systematically. Depending on the particular make-up of the Senate and the preferences of the President, the
outcome of Senate control of removal might sometimes be the same
as the outcome the President would have reached had he controlled
the removal of Cabinet secretaries, and might sometimes be different
than the outcome that the President would have reached. That is to
say, given the complexity of each of the branches of government,
claims to systematic differences among them are difficult to maintain.
The second implication of understanding the branches as multiinterested entities, rather than unitary bodies with systematic interests,
is more important. Understanding this about the branches should
make us less troubled by claims that a branch is strengthened or
weakened. Recall that such claims are based on the view that the
branches prefer different outcomes and that one branch's preferences will prevail more or less often under a particular arrangement.
The special concern about imbalance is that interests that prefer a
particular set of outcomes will be wrongly silenced or ignored (if they
are the interests associated with the branch that is weakened), or will
be inappropriately advantaged (if associated with the branch that is
It may be, as just argued, that the supposedly sysstrengthened) .
tematic differences among the branches are less systematic than conventional analysis assumes. But the point goes further; given the diversity of interests comprising the institutions, the chance that a
particular set of constituencies will be consistently silenced or ignored,
or consistently advantaged and preferred, is quite small. This is because the constituencies that have some influence in the branches before the change will continue to have some influence after the
change.

ally MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON

(1973). In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926), the Supreme Court held that
Congress could not constitutionally require the consent of the Senate for the removal
of a postmaster who had been appointed by the President with the Senate's approval.
For a discussion of Myers, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 193-95 (1990).
114 Cf Nourse, supra note 13, at 759 ("[T]he constitutional danger in shifting functions lies in popular silences and amplifications, in empowering some constituencies at
the expense of others.... [T]he problem with sending the war decision to the Court
is... the silencing of national and local constituencies on such an important issue....").
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To see the point, consider a world in which the President does not
have the veto power. We would say that the legislative branch was
strengthened and the executive branch weakened because Congress
no longer needed the approval of the President or a supermajority to
approve a statute. The executive branch is weakened because it cannot now achieve a set of outcomes that it could achieve with the existence of the veto: certain bills would not be laws, others might be
laws. Without the veto, that is, there are likely to be outcomes that
cannot be achieved. Those are outcomes supposedly systematically
favored by the executive branch and disfavored by the legislative
branch. On a crude rendering of those differential outcomes, one
predicated on the electoral base from which the bodies arise, the executive systematically will care more about constituencies with a national base, and the Congress more about constituencies with localized bases.
This rendering of the supposedly systematic differences among
the branches operates, however, at too high a level of generality, and
it therefore overstates the significance of a shift between the executive
and the legislature. Both the executive and the legislative branches
are composed of entities whose constituencies are more particularized
than the national/local description. Thus, for instance, the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) pays particular attention to
the concerns of farmers, and the committees in the Senate and House
with jurisdiction over agriculture do the same. " 5 Imagine that Congress has approved a statute providing significant subsidies to agriculture in a world where the President has no veto. That law was supported by a collection of interests-most important, of course, the
winning coalition in Congress, but also by the USDA. If the President
had a veto, the Secretary of Agriculture would have attempted to convince the President not to exercise the veto. Even so, assume that the
President, if he had a veto, would have vetoed the bill. Thus, in the
world without the veto, the bill is law. There is an outcome difference, but has some dangerous change in the balance of power occurred? That would be difficult to maintain. It is hardly as if the interests of farmers will disappear from the radar screen of government
actors. Under a different President-say, one with an electoral base
rooted in farm country-the nonexistence of the veto would not matter because the President, if he had the veto, would not have exercised
115

See generally JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE:

PRIVATE INTERESTS IN

NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 35-43 (1993) (providing an overview of key interest groups
in agriculture policy).
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it. The coalition in Congress will continue to be sympathetic to the
farm constituency. And, despite the outcome in this case, the USDA
remains a part of the executive branch and can be counted on to continue to urge the President to consider the needs of farmers.

The criticisms explored here expose the two central commitments
of conventional approaches to separation of powers as flawed. What
happens if we give up on that core? That is, is it possible to devise an
approach to separation of powers that does not depend on distinguishing among the powers of government and treating the branches
of government as entities that must be balanced with one another?
To start that effort, Part II speculates on the implications of the arguments advanced in Part I. The good news is that taking seriously the
criticism presented here offers a different, and perhaps more promising, way of guiding our understanding of separation of powers, one
that forgoes reliance on the comfortable guides of the three powers
and the three branches.
II. BEYOND POWERS AND BRANCHES

Conventional approaches to separation of powers aspire to identify and separate three different powers in three different branches
and to assure that some appropriate level of authority is maintained
among them. As Part I argued, both parts of that effort fail: the functions are difficult to distinguish and seem destined to blend together
at the margins; and maintaining some supposedly appropriate allocation of authority among branches is a fruitless enterprise, in part because the very inquiry itself is incoherent-branches are not bodies
with unitary interests, but are made up of diverse entities and individuals with varying concerns that do not simply correspond to branch
affiliation. Without an understanding of how functions could be kept
separate, or how branches could be kept balanced, conventional approaches have difficulty getting off the ground. We should see that
enterprise for what it is, a failure, and abandon it.
That failure does not mean there are no helpful ways to think
about the distribution of government authority within a separation of
powers system. To be sure, reconstruction of separation of powers law
will be difficult. Identifying the precise contours of that doctrine is
beyond the scope of this Article. We cannot start that effort, however,
without understanding exactly where current law goes wrong, and in
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that sense this Article contributes to that effort. But the criticisms offered here do more than clear the way for a reconceptualization of
separation of powers law; they assist in that effort. Taking seriously
some of the failings of current law not only reveals that we are asking
the wrong questions, it helps identify the right ones.
Reconstructing separation of powers law must begin by recalling
its aims. Most broadly, those aims are to fragment the exercise of government authority and to guarantee that fragmentation. A more finegrained appreciation of these objectives understands the effort to disperse power as having two distinct aspects. One is the diffusion of
government authority among a number of decisionmakers in order to
assure that no single decisionmaker (or institution) exercises all that
authority."" The point is familiar: having one, or even a few, actors
controlling all government authority increases the risk that state
power will be abused in some unquestionably awful way. What is important on this understanding is that a large enough range of decisionmakers share in the exercise of government authority. It does not
much matter what we call the power those decisionmakers exercise; it
just matters that government authority is diffused among them.
The effort to divide power and assure that it remains so divided
also has another, more ambitious and complicated, component:
matching the exercise of certain types of government authority with
specific types of government decisionmakers. ' 7 This aspect of the effort to fragment government authority is best illustrated by the widely
held intuition that individualized disputes should be adjudged by decisionmakers who have a duty to be impartial and, at the federal level
at least, are insulated from direct electoral politics. For this sort of effort to fragment power, the type of government power matters quite a
bit because certain categories of government authority can be appropriately exercised only by corresponding decisionmakers.
Orthodox approaches to separation of powers seek to satisfy both
these aims through the mechanisms analyzed in Part I. They aspire to
identify and separate the three functions into three institutions and to
assure some balance among those institutions. In theory at least, ad-

116

See REDISH, supra note 11, at 102-08 ("Mixed government was designed to pre-

vent absolutism-the arbitrary use of power-by avoiding the concentration of all state
power in one body."); Merrill, su/nra note 6, at 229, 246 (noting that "diffusion of
power among the branches" is an important and traditional purpose of separation of
powers).
117 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 9, at 21-39 (identifying
reasons why each of the three
powers are to be exercised by their corresponding institutions).
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ity."8 That government decisionmakers will protect their turf may be
intuitive, but that intuition is bolstered by the fact that these actors
have diverse incentives, making the risk that a critical mass of them
will collude to concentrate power (and hence be in a position to
abuse that authority) quite slim. These government decisionmakers
have varied ways of making policy decisions, operate under different
selection and tenure rules and thus have distinct constituencies (electoral or otherwise), and are located within institutions and subinstitutions with separate internal organization and norms. The factors that
push and pull those decisionmakers in different directions are about
as multifarious as can be imagined. It is this kind of variation among
multiple decisionmakers that supplies the kind of political culture that
we have. This political culture surely has its drawbacks. It is far from
cohesive; within its confines, it is even difficult to translate an overwhelming electoral mandate into dramatic policy change."9 But it
also has advantages: it offers many points of entry into the policymaking process and many types of decisionmakers with varied incentives
resulting from their distinct constituencies, institutional location, and
ways of doing business. Whatever its normative merits, however, this
system exhibits the trait sought by the conventional approaches:
within it, government authority is fragmented.
That we operate in a system where government authority is highly
fragmented, and is likely to remain so, has significant implications for
separation of powers doctrine. It means that a piece of that doctrine
is just concerned with the wrong thing. When courts or commentators stress the importance of keeping the exercise of government
functions in distinct branches, or assert that one branch will be aggrandized by an arrangement, one fear driving these claims is that the
failure to separate functions or prevent aggrandizement will lead to
dangerous concentrations of government power in one branch of

118See WILSON, supra note 110, at 179-95 (exploring the ways in which agencies

strive for autonomy and the consequences this has on government power).
119 See GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING:

AN

INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES 86-91, 88 (1994) (arguing that
the United States' form of separation of powers produces "paralysis and stalemates");
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 642-48 (2000)
(noting that in systems of separated powers there are problems of impasse that can
lead to accommodation, constitutional breakdown, or a "crisis in governability"); see
also DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-1990 (1991) (arguing that there is little measurable difference

in significant legislative output and frequency of congressional investigations based on
unified or divided government).
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hering to the conventional approach would mean that power would
generally be diffused among three government institutions and that
diffusion would occur in a specific way: three different powers would
be exercised by three corresponding branches. Of course, this Article
has argued that we cannot tell the difference between the powers in
contested cases and that there is no such thing as a branch in the
sense assumed by conventional approaches. This might sound like
bad news, but it is not; that critique offers important lessons for both
parts of the fragmentation effort.

The most important lesson is that if one is interested in assuring
that government authority is fragmented in a general way, the failure
of the conventional approaches need not be lamented. It is true that
we cannot identify the differences between the three powers and cannot speak coherently of balanced branches. But we do not need to
succeed with that effort in order to achieve fragmented government
authority. In the process of noticing that there is no such thing as
three essential powers exercised by three undifferentiated entities
called branches, we also should have noticed that, in fact, the exercise
of government authority is highly fragmented-it is just not fragmented according to the three-powers-in-three-branches formula.
Rather, we have a much more complicated form of fragmentation in
the political system that has evolved. In that system, government
authority is dispersed among a group larger than the usual suspects of
the three branches. State power is diffused among an enormous, and
diverse, array of decisionmakers who populate what we call the
branches. Within Congress: a house committee chair; a ranking
member of a Senate committee; and the deputy whip in the Senate or
the majority leader in the House. Within the executive: an agency
administrator; the director of the Office of Management and Budget;
and a United States attorney. Within the judiciary: a magistrate
judge; a bankruptcyjudge; a district courtjudge; and appellate judges.
Each of these decisionmakers plays some important role in the exercise of state power. If diffused government authority is what we are
after, we have it, in spades.
This kind of fragmentation is complicated, even chaotic, but it is
also our assurance against threatening concentrations of government
power. These many and varied government actors can be counted on
to protect their slice of decisionmaking authority, and, in that way,
they will naturally work against concentrations of government author-
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government. 2 0 At a doctrinal level, this concern about concentration
of state authority arises in numerous contexts: courts and commentators debate whether administrative agencies represent an impermissifunctions; 21 1 whether the line-item
ble combination of government• 122
whether the legislative veto agveto strengthened the executive;
grandized the Congress; or whether the executive has, as the result
of changes over time, become "the most dangerous branch" such that
be permitted to take action to counteract that pheCongress should
124
Each of these debates is, in part, about whether a parnomenon.
ticular branch of government possesses or will accumulate excessive
power. But once we recognize that government power can be, and is,
diffused within a branch, and that fragmentation of state power need
not (indeed cannot be comprehensibly understood to) be among
branches, the concern that an arrangement concentrates power in a
branch becomes anachronistic. Whatever else the line-item veto or
the legislative veto would do-and perhaps there are separate reasons
to be concerned about them-they would barely make a dent in the
extensive fragmentation of government authority that exists. With or
without those devices, government authority would remain diffused,
widely so, among varied decisionmakers.
Whether state authority is fragmented at exactly the right level is a
distinct and difficult question. Some claim that government authority
is far too fragmented in our system." 5 But trying to maintain the ideal
120 For

elaborations on this position, see REDISH, supra note 11, at 102-08;
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 8, at 559-65; Currie, supra note 9, at 19; Greene, supra
note 4, at 124; Lawson, supra note 8, at 1248-49; Magill, supra note 6, at 1183-84;
Merrill, supra note 6, at 229, 251.
1 See Currie, supra note 9, at 19-20 (describing situations in which agencies
appear to carry out executive, legislative, and judicial functions); Lawson, supra note 8, at
1237-41 (arguing that modern administrative agencies exercise legislative powers).
122 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 451-52 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (contending that the Line Item Veto Act enhanced the executive's powers
beyond the bounds of the Constitution); Devins, supra note 69, at 1624-25 (arguing
that the line-item veto does not unduly strengthen the executive); Powell & Rubenfeld,
supra note 3, at 1196 (detailing how the line-item veto could strengthen the executive).
m23See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 1368 (suggesting that the legislative veto aggrandizes Congress); Greene, supra note 4, at 165 (asserting that the Court's invalidation of
the legislative veto can be explained by the principle that Congress may not aggrandize
itself).
124 See Calabresi, supra note 80, at 31-34 (reviewing arguments that the executive is
now relatively weak compared to other branches); Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 86,
at 533 (arguing that there has been a shift in lawmaking power from Congress to the
President); Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1727 ("Never has the executive branch been more
powerful, nor more dominant over its two counterparts, than since the New Deal.").
125 Such claims are the centerpiece of arguments against separation of powers
sys-
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level of diffusion of state power would be a futile exercise. If the arguments contained in Part I.B are correct, it would not be possible to
design a doctrine that guaranteed just the right level of dispersal of
government authority. That enterprise would flounder in much the
same way that the effort to balance the branches flounders; we would
have to articulate an ideal level of fragmented power, identify the
amount of fragmentation at any point in time, and predict whether an
arrangement would threaten to undermine the appropriate level. To
be sure, it is not incoherent to talk about achieving fragmentation of
state power in the same way that it is incoherent to talk about maintaining a balance among branches."" Even so, the other difficulties
would prevent such an effort from being successful.
Despite the impossibility of designing a doctrine that perfectly polices the extent of the fragmentation of government authority, we
should not miss the significance of the insight that we operate in a system where state power is widely distributed, albeit not only on the
three-branch metric. Government authority is dispersed among many
decisionmakers, and, given their varied incentives, the likelihood of
that authority being consolidated in just a few hands is very small.
Completely assessing or controlling the extent of that fragmentation is
probably impossible. Nonetheless, the amount and character of that
diffusion of state power should be more than sufficient to put to rest
concerns about dangerous concentrations of power. Saying anything
more precise than that is difficult. But saying that is quite important.

The lesson for the more finely tuned aspect of the fragmentation
effort is more modest. That aspect aspires to something more than
generic diffusion of state power among varied decisionmakers; state
power must be dispersed in a particular way-that is, certain types of

tems. See, e.g., SARTORI, supra note 119, at 91 (arguing that "Americans do have a constitutional machine made for gridlock; a defect that shows in all its might when their
presidentialism is exported"); SEPARATION OF PowERs-DOES IT STILL WORK? (Robert
A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) (examining the argument that the constitutional separation of executive and legislative powers hinders the government's ability
to make domestic and foreign policy and to maintain a strong national defense); Ackerman, supra note 119, at 642-53 (examining the disadvantages of the American system
of an independently elected executive).
126 See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text (arguing that claims about
balance among the branches are incoherent because the branches are not unitary entities
with identifiable interests).
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27
power must be matched with certain types of decisionmakers.
There are complicated, sometimes unstated, reasons for these
matches. Beliefs about the correspondence between a power and a
decisionmaker are based on intuitions about the suitability of types of
decisionmakers (a single person, rather than a collegial body, must
decide this sort of question)'2 or normative convictions, such as what
liberal democracy requires (a multimember, broadly representative,
elected body must make this kind of decision).'29 In pursuit of this
type of fragmentation, conventional approaches to separation of powers seek to identify the three government functions and make certain
that they are exercised by the corresponding institution. But we cannot possibly assure the right union between power and branch because, as Part I argued, we cannot tell the difference* between the
powers in contested cases and we should not think of institutions as if
they were monolithic entities. That does not mean that there are no
useful ways to think about what types of decisionmakers should exercise different kinds of government authority. It will just make us see
that effort in a new light.
Matching the exercise of certain types of power with corresponding decisionmakers is, to say the least, an ambitious undertaking. Assertions that some actors are most capable of, or normatively required
to, exercise particular state powers entail a host of difficult and vexing
questions. At the broadest level, those questions include: Which policy judgments must the legislature make and which can be left to
those who implement the law?;"30 What sorts of decisions should, or

127

See Currie, supra note 9, at 21-23, 31-32, 37 (describing and explaining why

three powers are assigned to the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary).
12FAllocating government authority based on institutional
competence is classically associated with the legal process school. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE IE(AL PROCSSV,
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li, lx-lxi, xci-xcvi (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (stating that the book "incorporate [s]
the idea of comparative institutional competence"). Professor Currie is an example of
a separation of powers commentator who draws on that tradition. See Currie, supra
note 9, at 31 (stating that the executive power was vested in the President, inter alia,
because of "the need to concentrate executive power in the hands of a single person").
129 See Currie, supra note 9, at 22 (stating that legislative power was
vested in the
Congress because "it was important to give some substantial role in lawmaking to a
body directly elected by the people" and because of "the value of having legislative decisions made by a collective body in which various interests were represented"); Lawson, supra note 8, at 1239 (describing the core of the Constitution's nondelegation
principle as providing that "Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them").
1.30This is the question at the heart of debates over the appropriateness and wis-
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should not, be made by decisionmakers who enjoy the independence
afforded federal judges?; Is the President best suited to have expanAnswers to
sive powers over foreign affairs and military action?'
those questions depend on contested normative convictions and
complicated empirical assessments. But it is these sorts of questionsalbeit sometimes in less elevated form, as in whether administrative
agencies can adjudicate controversies or whether an independent
counsel is permissible-that lurk in the background of disputes about
the proper allocation of government authority. Those questions will
obviously remain contested for years to come.
That these questions are vexing does not mean that they should
not be asked. But current separation of powers doctrine asks them in
the wrong way. The critique offered here identifies a particular failing
of the questions we ask in our effort to assure the appropriate assignment of government authority and simultaneously suggests the more
promising questions. The basic falling is a mismatch between the nature of the distribution of government authority and the doctrine that
purports to evaluate that distribution. Our system operates not at the
level of powers or branches but at the more particular level of government decisionmaker. State power is dispersed among a large, and
diverse, set of government decisionmakers; what they do cannot neatly
be sorted into three categories of power, nor can their branch affiliation be considered the determinative factor in how they will make
their decisions. But current doctrine operates as if there were essential powers called legislative, executive, and judicial power that can be
appropriately matched with branches called the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches. Those inquiries, as Part I argued, are fruitless.
But the point goes beyond that; for a doctrine that seeks to assure a
suitable assignment of government authority among varied actors,

dom of the congressional delegation of policy questions to administrative agencies.
The prime modern work, which characterizes congressional delegation as abdication
of the most serious sort, is THEODOREJ. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
13 Questions about the independence and role of the federal courts arise in many
contexts, most prominently in the debate over the advisability and proper scope of judicial review. The familiar classics of this debate include ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) and
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

12 Again, this is the question at the center of
many long-standing disputes. See
JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993) (arguing that Congress has unconstitutionally abdicated its responsibility to make decisions about entry into war and ceded
that role to the executive); PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF
POwERS LAW 585-854 (1996) (surveying disputes regarding allocation of authority between Congress and the President on foreign affairs and war powers).
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that abstract and lofty level is off track. The categories do not meaningfully describe the powers exercised, nor does the doctrine ask
questions that help predict how government authority will be exercised. In other words, the doctrine should descend from its perch and
focus on the fact that it is government actors, not powers and
branches, that matter.
Before we can determine how state power should be distributed
among varied government decisionmakers, we first need to know how
those decisionmakers have or will exercise authority. To do that, we
need to understand how officials exercise their authority. This requires a different analysis than the powers-and-branches approach
that current doctrine contemplates. Under the structure of current
doctrine, the debate about the legislative veto focuses on whether a
33
Discussion
subset of the Congress was given the power to legislate.
whether
on
part,
of the permissibility of the line-item veto centered, in
34
it gave the executive the power to legislate.' The disputes about the
United States Sentencing Commission and the independent counsel
followed a slightly different pattern: they focused not on a characterization of the type of power exercised, but instead on whether those
arrangements undermined the exercise of the relevant branch's function. 1 5 But analyzing any of these questions by characterizing the
power exercised and discerning whether it is in the right branch, or
even asking whether, as in the case of the independent counsel or the
Sentencing Commission, the arrangement interfered with the
branch's exercise of its function, is the wrong way to think about
them. These questions send us looking in the wrong direction-trying to define the meaning of executive power, or to identify a core
function of a branch and judge whether it is threatened. Those in-

See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983) (holding the legislative veto to
be unconstitutional because it effectively allowed one house of Congress to legislate on
its own).
134 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 451-52 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the line-item veto is unconstitutional in that it gives the executive power to legislate); Powell & Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1172-80 (giving arguments on both sides of the debate over whether the line-item veto gives the power to
legislate to the executive).
135 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-97 (1989) (holding that Congress
did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by placing the Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-96 (1988) (holding
that the power of the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, a court created by the Ethics in Government Act, to terminate an Independent Counsel's office is not a significant judicial encroachment upon executive
power).
13
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quiries do nothing to help us determine how state authority is likely to
be exercised. To do that, we need to focus on the incentives of government actors. And that focus must be not at the level of a branch of
government, but at a less elevated level, one that is meaningful to
those government actors. Such analysis would work much closer to
the ground-investigating the relevant decisionmakers, the context in
which they act, the process by which they will reach their decisions,
and the constraints on their actions.
To see how such a doctrine might look, consider the question of
the permissibility of the mix of powers that many administrative agencies exercise. Within the framework of conventional approaches,
there are two competing questions to ask. For some, that debate
should center-on whether such agencies exercise solely the power assigned to the branch in which they sit, that is, executive power, or
whether they also impermissibly exercise judicial power (owing to
their authority to adjudicate controversies) and legislative power (because of the broad discretion they have to formulate the law) .
For
those skeptical of such functional niceties, the relevant question is
whether the mix of powers those agencies exercise serves to undermine the core functions of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branches.13 But both routes are off track. To evaluate whether an
administrative agency should be permitted to exercise a range of powers, first we need to understand how the agency does or can be expected to exercise those powers. Labeling the powers or asking
whether, in some broad-brush way, a branch is threatened by the ar-

136 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859-67
(1986) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (arguing that adjudication of a state-law counterclaim
by an administrative tribunal is an unconstitutional exercise ofjudicial power by a nonArticle Ill entity); Lawson, supra note 8, at 1237-41 (arguing that administrative agencies often exercise legislative power and should be unconstitutional for that reason);
supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text (surveying, inter alia, formalist position,
which would ask the question identified in the text); cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 705-10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that prosecution is an executive
function and therefore the President must be able to fire at will a prosecutor exercising that power).
137 Independent agencies arguably
threaten the integrity of each branch: the executive because of appointments arrangements that limit the President's ability to fire
at will officials who head those agencies; the legislative because of the expansive discretion agencies can have to implement the law; and the judicial because of the adjudicatory functions some agencies are assigned. For examples of this undermine-the-branch
reasoning in the context of administrative agencies, see Schor, 478 U.S. at 851-52, which
upheld adjudication of a state-law counterclaim by an administrative tribunal because,
inter alia, such adjudication did not impermissibly threaten the institutional integrity
of thejudicial branch; and Strauss, supra note 9, at 640-66.
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rangement, does not help us do that. Instead, we should seek to understand the incentives of the actors who will exercise that power in a
pointed enough way that it helps us comprehend how those powers
will be exercised. Some legal observers pursue this kind of analysis,
but far too few. 13 A sufficiently grounded inquiry into officials' incentives requires a contextual investigation of how state power will be exercised: understanding the organization of the agency; the process by
which its actors will make decisions; and the constraints on its decisionmaking131' At a minimum, the analysis must take account of the
complicated web of subconstitutional law that governs the actions of
agencies, 411 given that such constraints importantly shape the way
agency authority is exercised. This is not to suggest that understanding how government actors are likely to exercise authority will be easy.
It will not be. But focusing the doctrine in this way will at least move it
in the right direction.
Compared to the enormity of the questions sometimes at stake in
the effort to achieve the right match between the government authority and the government decisionmaker, the teaching of this Article is
modest. It does not supply answers to the fundamental questions that

138

Assessing the advisability of an allocation of state power can of course start with

a close study of how that power has been exercised. In an influential study, Professors
Bniff and Gellhorn did just that with the legislative veto. Harold H. Bruff & Ernest
Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes,
90 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1381-1423 (1977). Likewise, Professor Martin's arguments
against the legislative veto are informed by an appreciation of the way those vetoes operated in practice. David A. Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of
CongressionalPower, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 267-93 (1982). When an arrangement is new
and must be evaluated, such empirical work is not possible. But one can still make
judgments about how an official or entity might exercise government authority by trying to understand the key officials' likely incentives. A few legal analysts evaluate the
distribution of government authority based on the likely behavior of the officials who
will exercise that authority. See, e.g., Calabresi, sufra note 80, at 34-35 (arguing for a
strong executive based on the incentives of the President); Nourse, supra note 13, at
757-68 (examining departmental power as sets of political relationships between the
public and the government, rather than as sets of tasks).
1.39 See NISKANEN, supra note 111, at 45-77 (applying the methods of economics
to
develop a theory of the behavior of bureaus in a representative government); WILSON,
supra note 110, at 27-28 (attempting to explain the behavior of bureaucracies in terms
of their organizations, operators, managers, and executives); Levinson, supra note 110,
at 380-87 (arguing that in order to predict agency behavior, one must take account of
the agency relationship between elected officials and bureaucrats).
Many general statutes constrain agency activities; the most prominent one is
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994). Agencies are also constrained by other general instruments, such as executive orders that direct how agencies will conduct their business, as well as the specific statutes that create the agency
and grant it the authority to act in specific areas.
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underpin disputes about the proper allocation of government authority. There are no clean answers here about the great questions-the
appropriate division of policymaking between the Congress and the
executive, or the proper role of the judiciary in a representative democracy. Nor are there clear answers about the less elevated manifestations of those questions: Should administrative agencies be permitted to adjudicate disputes arising under the laws they administer?; Is
an independent counsel permissible? The reward for the effort is
more incremental; the insight is that a reconstructed separation of
powers doctrine must ask a different set of questions than it does now
when it is seeking to match the exercise of classes of government
authority with corresponding decisionmakers. Finally answering the
fundamental questions may be far off, but we will not get any closer
until we start asking questions that point us in the right direction.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the two central commitments of contemporary separation of powers doctrine are failures and should be
recognized as such. Talk of three separate powers exercised by three
balanced branches is familiar, achingly so. It is also an unhelpful way
to evaluate whether an institutional arrangement is constitutional.
The burden of this Article is that it is time to give up on these ideas in
favor of new ways of thinking about separation of powers law. Fortunately, understanding exactly where current doctrine goes wrong provides critical insights into the ways a revised doctrine could go right.
The sketch of the reconstructed separation of powers law contained
here concludes that we should stop worrying about some questionsbecause they focus on false threats-and that we should worry about
the others by asking a different, less lofty, set of questions.

